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LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: A PROBLEM IN CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION
A. LEO LEVIN t AND ANTHONY G. AmSTERDAm $
The allocatim of the power to make court rules is a topic of central concern
in the review and revision of state coistitutions. In this Article, Professor
Levin, teacher and author of nutumerous articles on procedure and evidentiary
rules, and his co-author and student, Mr. Amsterdam, present their program
for a division of responsibility between court and legislature.

Naked struggle for power between coordinate branches of government has not been unknown in the United States. The familiar episodes
have grown out of grand issues which invited dramatic clashes of
mighty forces. When these have occurred the judiciary has not always
stood aloof from the fray, as the history of the ill-fated Court-packing
plan of the thirties demonstrates. But lesser conflicts have posed problems for legislative and judicial minds: who shall write headnotes,'
when cases shall be decided,' even what manner of paper shall be used
for opinions.3 The judge locked out of court and waiting with the
f Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Member of Advisory Committee on Court Procedure and Administration, Pa. Joint State Government Commission, and of Subcommittee on Judiciary Article. A.B., Yeshiva College, 1939; LL.B.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1942.
: Member, Class of 1960, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B., Haverford College, 1957.
1. In re Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83, 20 N.E. 513 (1889), held invalid a statute requiring
the court to make a syllabus of each opinion.
2. See the holding in Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Long, 122 Okla. 86, 251 Pac.
486 (1926), discussed in text at note 149 infra. A similar holding is Schario v. State,
105 Ohio St. 535, 138 N.E. 63 (1922).
3. In Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859), the court held unconstitutional as
an encroachment upon judicial independence a statute requiring written opinions in
all appellate court decisions. Field, J. wrote, for the court: "If the Legislature can
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litigants in the corridor as a result of controversy over room assignments,4 the elevator operator de jure but not de facto,5 the judge-made
janitor denied his executive pay checks ' are not heroic figures, yet they
have left a legacy of increased understanding in the difficult area of
separation of powers. Neither epic nor mock-epic, these struggles have
a drama of their own ' and a cogent contemporary significance. They
reflect a facet of the difficult and recurring problem of allocation of
authority between court and legislature.
To examine afresh such allocation of power is a central concern
of Convention or Commission whenever a state's basic charter is subjected to review. In the course of such review there must inevitably
be posed this question: what should be the place of the legislature in
the control of the courts and their business? To deal with this question
require the reasons of our decisions to be stated in writing, it can forbid their statement in writing, and enforce their oral announcement, or prescribe the paper upon
which they shall be written, and the ink which shall be used. And yet no sane man
will justify any such absurd pretension, but where is the limit to this power if its
exercise in any particular be admitted?" Id. at 25.
4. Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 48 N.E. 137 (1897), was a proceeding in
criminal contempt involving a county courthouse custodian who, under the directions
of the board of county commissioners, had changed locks on the courtroom door
during adjournment and refused readmittance to the judge, sheriff, bailiffs, attorneys,
parties and witnesses in an attempt to enforce the board's assignment of particular
courtrooms to individual judges. Said Magruder, J., "To make the judges of our
courts depend upon a legislative or political body for the rooms in which they shall
hold their sessions . . . would be to destroy the dignity and independence of the
judiciary." Id. at 109, 48 N.E. at 140.
5. Board of Comn'rs v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 35 N.E. 683 (1893). The board of
commissioners sued for an injunction to restrain the sheriff from operating the courthouse elevator. The sheriff, under orders from the circuit court, had seized control
of the elevator and ousted its commission-appointed operator in the course of a hassle
between court and board as to the hours of operation of the car. The board, in retaliation, sought to shut down the elevator altogether. The Supreme Court of Indiana,
while judging the controversy "not seemly," upheld the power of the court and denied
injunctive relief.
6. In re Janitor, 35 Wis. 410 (1874), held void an order of the state superintendent of public property dismissing the court-chosen janitor of the supreme court.
A statute granting to the superintendent the power of control over the custodial
personnel of the capitol was held by the court not to vest in said superintendent jurisdiction over the person of the court janitor, but "the power to remove or appoint the
janitor is possessed by the court." Id. at 421.
7. A "spark thrown off in the clash of forces now contending for dominance in
the administration of justice" is McCormick's characterization of Kolkman v. People,
89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931). McCormick, Legislature and Supremne Court Clash on
Rude-Making Power in Colorado, 27 ILL. L. REV. 664 (1933). Under a grant of rulemaking power from the legislature, the supreme court had in 1929 promulgated a rule
the effect of which was to permit trial judges to comment on the evidence to the jury.
Following such comment Kolkman was convicted of hog-theft and appealed. Thereafter, but before the case could be decided on appeal, the legislature passed a statute
revising its earlier grant of power and expressly declaring that the court should
make no rule which would permit comment on the evidence. The majority opinion
makes no express reference to this statute, but does undertake a spirited defense of
the inherent right of a court to make its own rules without the authorization of statute.
It appears from a dissenting opinion that the majority opinion was rewritten to include
this discussion as a result of the legislative action. The court's opinion indicated that
a search of the constitution revealed "no provision therein expressly directing or
permitting the legislative or executive departments to make rules with reference to
trial procedure in the judicial department of the government," and cited Wigmore.
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it is necessary to consider, however briefly, some of the history, the
present patterns of division of power, the doctrines and dogma which
define them, all of these in the light of considerations which to us
appear basic.
TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE RULE-MAKING
POWER

From a constitutional point of view, the major problems of today
were begotten by the successes in procedural reform achieved over the
past quarter century. It may be hard to conceive of the abolition of
the bill of particulars or the availability of pre-trial hearings as responsible for constitutional issues. It becomes less difficult when one
recognizes that the advances in adjective law during this period were
achieved primarily as the result of persuading legislators to invest appellate courts with rule-making powers,' a disposition of authority
which proved so felicitious that it gave rise to insistent demand that it
be guaranteed by express constitutional provision.
For decades, if not for centuries, control over practice and procedure has been the subject of a concurrent jurisdiction.9 There were
the courts with an alleged inherent power to engage in rule-making," °
and there were the legislatures which in fact exercised and were, with
but rare dissent, conceded ultimate authority over virtually the entire
procedural area." Nor was this basic allocation of power challenged
All Legislative Rides for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L.
REv. 276 (1928). This amounted, in the words of a dissenting justice, to "this warning
to the Legislature: Hands offl There must be no more codes of civil procedure.
Kolkman v. People, supra at 42-43, 300 Pac. at 590. In fact four opinions
of some sixty-seven pages were written and reveal a harsh struggle of personalities
among the members of the court.
8. The great landmark of this reform is of course the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure of 1938, important not only in their own right but for their profound and
immediate stimulating influence upon procedural revision throughout the states. States
Move To Modernize Civil Procedure,24 J. Am!. JuD. Soc'y 189 (1941) ; Mitchell, The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in DAvID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY EssAYs 73,
79 (1949); INsrruTE OF JUItcrAL ADmIISTRATION, RULE-MAKING POWER OF TE

CouRTs passim (1955). See also Clark, The Influence of Federal ProceduralReform,
13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 159-61 (1948); Clark, Two Decades of the Federal
Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958). But it must not be forgotten that in
England a virtually absolute control over all procedure had been placed in the hands
of the bench and bar by the Judicature Act of 1873, which went into effect in 1875,
Marvel, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 13 A.B.A.J. SuPP. 14, 15 (1927);
and that the federal courts in the United States had been exercising rule-making power
in equity and admiralty under statutory grant from as early as 1842, Winberry v.
Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 253, 74 A.2d 406, 413 (1950). It was to these earlier achievenients that the reformers who led the fight for the Federal Rules appealed for authority. Pound, Regulating Procedural Details by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A.J. SUPp. 12
(1927) ; Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 602 (1926).
9. CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (4th ed. 1931); VANDERBILT, MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF JUDIcAL ADINISTRATION III (1949). Cases are collected in Annots.,

158 A.L.R. 705 (1945), 110 A.L.R. 22 (1937).
10. Pound, Tle Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 601 (1926);
VANDERBILT, of'. cit. supra note 9; Annots., sut'ra note 9.
11. Ibid. The most famous dissent is by Wigmore, supra note 7.
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by those who sought to effect a unitied federal procedure by way of
court rule. Indeed, in the atmosphere created by 150 years of legislative
control of judicial matters, it was inevitable that these reformers should
have sought congressional mandate, that the Supreme Court should
have been "enabled" to promulgate rules, and that the legislature should
have retained a right of veto over what the Supreme Court might
choose to adopt.'2
The success of the federal endeavor stimulated a multi-pronged
reform program by the American Bar Association,"8 the "keystone" 14
of which was the recommendation that state supreme courts everywhere
be invested by statute with similiar rule-making powers. This was
1938. In the ensuing years the "trend throughout the country" has
been to charge the courts with rule-making responsibility, 5 bench and
bar have become "rule-conscious," '1and the climate of the time is such
that the "rule-making power of the courts .

.

. is brought into focus

wherever procedural reform is undertaken." 17
Understandably, the next step was to provide for constitutional
grant of judicial rule-making powers whenever opportunity presented
itself. By this expedient the legislative recalcitrance, not to speak of
bitter opposition, which had come so close to aborting at its start the
program which led to the Federal Rules might be avoided. The long
and arduous political struggles to push through enabling acts, and the
initial doubts as to the validity of delegation to judges of "legislative"
authority over procedure '8 were still fresh in the minds of the reformers.'" So too was the mounting evidence of the success of the
Federal Rules which were being accorded the accolade of a "universal
12. It is interesting to note that this atmosphere and history carries over to influence the framing of constitutional provisions. See discussion of the New Jersey
experience in Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making:
An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HAgv. L. REv. 234, 241-42 (1951).
13. ABA, THE IMPRO EMENT OF THE AnmINISTRATION OF JUsTIcE (3d ed. 1952).
14. Id. at 10-11.
15. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 253, 74 A.2d 406, 413 (1950).
16. Curd, Substance and Procedure in Rule-Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34, 36
(1948).
17. Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial RuleMaking, 55 MicH. L. Rv. 623 (1957).
18. See, e.g., discussion in In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wisconsin
Statutes, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931); and State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60
P2d,646, 110 A.L.R. 1 (1936).
19. For a history of the struggle for a federal enabling act, see Clark, The Influence of Federal ProceduralReform, 13 Lw .& CoNT=sP. PROB. 144, 145-48 (1948).
Note that Roscoe Pound, for example, a leader in the drive for the enabling acts
later also participated in the fight for constitutional grant of rule-making power to
the courts. See Pound, Procedure Under Rudes of Court in New Jersey, 66 HAIv.
L. REv. 28, 42 (1952).
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chorus of approval" 20 and the more meaningful compliment of imitation, in whole or in part, by a majority of the states.2 ' Failure to
consolidate these gains would be folly.
Thus the recent history of constitutional drafting in this country
came to reflect a consistent concern with rule-making by the judiciary.
Since 1945, Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Missouri, New Jersey and Puerto
Rico have adopted new constitutions." In every one but that of Georgia
rule-making power is expressly granted to the highest court of the
jurisdiction,2 and in Georgia the Constitutional Commission approved
such a provision 24 only to have it deleted.25 Whatever the weight of
a "trend" of decision2 in the forum of political action, it was being
added to that of theorists and reformers 27 by establishing the feasibility
and desirability of vesting rule-making power in the courts by constitutional mandate.
THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE

To concede this much as established, however, to decide in favor
of a constitutional grant of judicial rule-making authority, is to resolve
no more than a single, preliminary question. A host of others remain.
What of the legislature? Shall it be turned out of the arena of practice
and procedure, or shall there be reserved to the duly elected representatives of the people a right of veto over the actions of the court? If we
choose to retain substantial legislative control, under what terms and
within what limits shall that control be available? Shall court and
legislature each have a right to act in areas not pre-empted by the other?
If power is concurrent, shall both be equally responsible for rule20. Clark, The Influenwe of Federal Procedural Reform, 13

LAW

&

CoNTEMP.

PROB. 144, 152 (1948).

21. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLum. L. Rav. 435 n2

(1958).
The text at this point adds: . . . hardly a local jurisdiction remains
unaffected."
22. Alaska, 1956; Georgia, 1945; Missouri, 1945; New Jersey, 1947; Puerto

Rico, 1952. Florida New Judiciary Article, 1956.
23. See note 36 infra. See Pirsig, The Proposed Amendient to the Judiciary
Article of the Minnesota Constitution, 40 MINN. L. REv. 815, 820 (1956), re Minnesota's decision not to provide constitutionally for rule-making in the 1956 amended

judiciary article.
24. 2 REcoDS OF THE Commissio

oF 1943-1944 To RxxsE THE CoNsTiTuTiO N
OF GEORGiA 55, 58 (1946).
25. GA. CONsT. art. VI, § 2-3708. From the statement of Roy Vincent Harris in
the course of the debate before the commission, supra note 24, at 34, a legislature
jealous of its prerogatives may have been an important factor. Promptly after adoption of the constitution, a statutory grant of rule-making power to the supreme court
was enacted. GA. CoDE ANN. § 81-1501 (Supp. 1955). The statute provides, however,
that no rule shall take effect until ratified by the legislature. Id. § 81-1502.
26. See the discussion of "trends" in the text infra at note 121.
27. Indeed, the flood of rule-making literature is so great that citation is currently to bibliographies. See Joiner & Miller, supra note 17, at 623 n.1. In fact,
one conscientious researcher a decade ago had already reported that "the literature
in favor of the rule-making authority in the courts is now so extensive that even the
bibliographies cannot be included here." Clark, supra note 19 at 160 n.54.
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formulation, or shall the initiative be assigned to one with the task of
review and evaluation left to the other? Or shall we attempt, as New
Jersey appears to have done in 1948, subtly to differentiate between
areas in which the court is immune from legislative review and other
areas in which it remains subject to legislative veto? 28
These are not questions of mere detail. They, and others in similar vein, are fundamental, for they indicate a range of possibilities
grouped primarily about two competing major premises. The first
affirms the desirability of full rule-making responsibility in a judiciary
insulated from legislative interference. The second posits acceptance,
in some form, of concurrent jurisdiction between the two coordinate
branches of government. To choose the latter alternative is to stay
within the broad framework of present practice. It is not, however,
the simpler course nor does it represent acceptance of the status quo,
for the conditions under which courts and legislatures shall exercise
their respective jurisdictions must, of necessity, be examined afresh
before being raised to the level of constitutional mandate.
Alternatives abound. We have mentioned five recently adopted
constitutions which expressly affirm rule-making power in their courts.
°
In addition to these, California,29 Maryland," Michigan,' Missouri 832
34
and Nebraska' now provide for the making of rules by the judiciary.
In Illinois, the proposed Judiciary Article to be submitted to the
voters in November 1958 ' makes similar provision. These eleven
documents represent no less than eleven differing solutions to the problem of allocating responsibility between court and legislature.3 6 They
28. N.J. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2, 3; see note 36 mlfra.
29. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § la (1926) ; see note 36 infra.
30. Mn. CONST. art. IV, § 18A (1944) ; see note 36 infra.
31. MIcH. CONST. art. VII, § 5; see note 36 infra.
32. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5; see note 36 infra.
33. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 25 (1920) ; see note 36 infra.
34. The California Constitution, art. VI, § la (1926), vests power in a Judicial
Council composed of eleven judges from the courts of all levels; the other constitutions
vest power in the respective highest courts of the jurisdiction. For brief consideration
of the role of the judicial council where rule-making power is vested in the highest
court, see text infra at note 50.
35. I1. Coinst. Proposed Amenzdment art. VI, §3, ILL. ANN. STAT. (Supp. 1957).
36. The Philippine constitution represents in pure form the doctrine of judicial
initiative and ultimate legislative review. The supreme court is granted "the power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and
the admission to the practice of law." All pre-constitutional laws regulating procedure
are repealed as statutes and declared rules of court, subject to modification by the
court, so that the way is cleared for a unified system of procedure by court rule.
It is declared that such rules "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights." Legislative review is sweeping and unqualified: "The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines." PHIL. CONST.
art. VIII, § 13.
The intendment of the proposed Judicial Article of the State of Illinois is
apparently similarly to establish a scheme of concurrent power with express dictate
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make it abundantly clear that it is impossible cavalierly to reject any
of the available alternatives. Yet election among them in the disof legislative supremacy in the event of conflict between rule and statute; the power
of the court to promulgate rules is "subject to law and laws hereafter enacted."
Ill. Const. Proposed Amendment art. VI, §3, ILL. ANN. STAT. (Supp. 1957).
This express declaration of legislative dominance is particularly significant in that
the original draft of a proposed Judiciary Article prepared by the Joint Committee
on Judicial Article of Chicago and Illinois State Bar Associations had unequivocally
vested the rule-making power in the courts with no provision for legislative review.
1952 U. ILL. L. FoRuM 592; Sears, A New Judicial Article for Illinois, 40 A.B.A.J.
755, 804 (1954). "After considerable research and soul-searching," the Committee
had "determined that rules of practice and procedure were an essential aspect of the
judicial power and that the independence and integrity of the judicial system required
that such power be vested exclusively in the courts." Cohn, The Illinois Judicial
System Under the Proposed Judicial Article, 46 ILL. B.J. 593, 602 (1958). In this
determination the legislature did not concur, but explicitly subjected the rule-making
power to "laws hereafter enacted," in which provision "future laws relating to procedure were clearly intended to be included.' Trumbull, Why Lawyers Should Support the Judicial Amendment, 46 ILL. B.J. 434, 448 (1958).
In like manner the
Maryland Constitution vests in the court of appeals power to make rules "which
shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of
Appeals or otherwise by law." MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18a (1944).
An approach still more restrictive of judicial power is that of the California
constitution. A 1926 amendment creates a Judicial Council of eleven judges chosen
by the chief justice in specified numbers from the courts of all trial and appellate
levels, to "meet at the call of the chairman or as otherwise provided by it." The
Council is vested with power to "adopt or amend rules of practice or procedure for
the several courts not inconsistent with laws that are now or that may hereafter be
in force." CAL. CONST. art. VI, § la(5) (1926). But inasmuch as the field of procedure was already exhaustively covered by statute in 1926, the grant of a power
which could not act to supersede even pre-amendment law was of little practical effect.
It was clear that the amendment had reserved "to the legislature and the people the
primary and higher right to provide rules of procedure for our courts, with the
secondary right in the Judicial Council to adopt rules only, when and where the
higher authority of the Legislature and the people has not been exercised." Lane v.
Superior Ct., 104 Cal. App. 340, 344, 285 Pac. 860, 862 (1930) ; Stockton Theaters v.
Palermo, 47 Cal. 2d 469, 476-77, 304 P.2d 7, 11 (1956). The Council appears
rather an advisory panel to the legislature than an independent power; it is to "submit
to the Legislature, at each regular session thereof, its recommendations with reference
to amendments of, or changes in, existing laws relating to practice and procedure."
CAL. CoNsT. art. 6, § la(5) (1926). In fact, Calfornia procedure remains almost
entirely governed by code, INSTITUT

OF JUDicIAL ADmiNisTmATioN,

RULE-MAING

PowEn OF THE CoUirrs 4 (1955), except that rules of the Judicial Council now govern
all appellate procedure under special statutory authority. CAL. CODE Civ. P. § 961,
CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1247K.

In similar manner, an amendment to the Nebraska constitution empowered the
supreme court to "promulgate rules of practice and procedure for all courts, uniform
as to each class of courts, and not in conflict with laws governing such matters. To
the same end the court may, and when requested by the Legislature by joint resolution,
shall certify to the Legislature, its conclusions as to the desirable amendments or
changes in the general laws governing such practice and proceedings." Nm. CONST.
art. V, § 25 (1920). This merely advisory and statute-supplementing role of the
court was converted into full rule-making power by legislative enabling act in 1939,
but when the court proposed a battery of rules to the legislature in 1943, the legislature rejected the rules and repealed the enabling act. VANDMBILT, MINInM
STANDARDs OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION 117 (1949). Thus in California and Ne-

braska the full and absolute authority over procedure remains in the legislature; and
what is constitutionally granted to the courts proves merely a patchwork power which,
as Vanderbilt points out, is in the final analysis no power at all. "The supplemntary
power is common. All but a few courts exercise such power to some extent. The
complete power is the true rule-making power both historically and analytically; a
court cannot be said to be exercising rule-making power unless its rules override
statutory rules." Id. at 92.
The Missouri constitution of 1945 limits judicial rule-making in terms of subject
matter. The supreme court is empowered to make rules of practice and procedure

8

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

tribution of power is a fundamental and inevitable problem of constitutional revision. Any serious attempt at drafting a judiciary article
must meet the issue frontally. It cannot be ignored.
for all courts, subject to the proviso that "the rules shall not change substantive
rights, or the law relating to evidence, the oral examination of witnesses, juries, the
right of trial by jury, or the right of appeal." Moreover, even outside of the charmed
circle within which judicial power is forbidden, "any rule may be annulled or amended
by a law limited to the purpose." Mo. CoNsT. art. V, § 5. In terms the grant seems
more restricted than that of the Philippine provision or the Illinois proposal. But
dictum in a recent Missouri Supreme Court case appears to unsettle the legislative
hegemony by attack from another angle. While recognizing that "the Legislature
is given power to annul or amend" court rules, the court asserts that "a rule of practice
and procedure established by this court under the authority of section 5 . . .would
prevail over a previously enacted statute if there was a direct conflict." See State v.
Adams, 365 Mo. 1015, 1019, 291 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1956). Thus the court's language
would seem to place ultimate power over matters of procedure in Missouri in a sort
of no man's land between court and legislature and to invite, in case of conflict, a cyclic
scramble for the last word. See the South Dakota statute set out at note 130 infra.
An altogether different kind of restriction upon court control of procedure is
demonstrated by the judiciary article of the Puerto Rico constitution: "The Supreme
Court shall adopt for the courts rules of evidence and of civil and criminal procedure
which shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of the parties. The
rules thus adopted shall be submitted to the Legislative Assembly at the beginning
of its next regular session and shall not go into effect until sixty days after the close
of said session, unless disapproved by the Legislative Assembly, which shall have
the power both at said session and subsequently to amend, repeal or supplement any
of said rules by a specific law to that effect." P.R. CoNsT. art. V, § 6. Under the
immediate supervisory power of the legislature, the court is given an initiative
authority over procedure which is expressly extended into the area of evidence and
to that extent is wider than the power granted by any other constitution. But the
price it pays for this extended scope is a loss of flexibility. No procedural revision
need be delayed beyond the close of the next legislative session; but every revision
must be delayed at least that long. Moreover, it remains open to the legislature to
intervene at will over the full range of practice and procedure with no other deterrent
to hasty, ill-considered action than that it be by "specific law."
At the other extreme from jurisdictions which severely circumscribe the judicial
authority is New Jersey where under the constitution of 1947, N.J. CONsT. art. VI,
§ 2, 1 3, and the celebrated case of Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406
(1950), the power of the courts has reached its apogee. See text at note 108 infra.
The constitutional mandate directs that "the Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the practice
and procedure in all such courts." In Winberry v. Salisbury the appellate division
of the superior court, holding that this provision caused rules of court made under
its authority to supersede all conflicting pre-constitutional statutes governing procedure, indicated that nevertheless "the legislature is given the final word in matters
of procedure; it may expressly or by implication nullify or modify a procedural rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court, or it may take the initiative in a matter of procedure when it deems that course wise." 5 N.J. Super. 30, 34, 68 A.2d 332, 334
(App. Div. 1949). This was dictum. Rejecting it, Chief Justice Vanderbilt for the majority of the supreme court replied "IT]he phrase 'subject to law' cannot be taken to
mean subject to legislation. . . . The only interpretation of 'subject to law' that will
not defeat the objective of the people to establish an integrated judicial system and
which will at the same time give rational significance to the phrase is to construe it as
the equivalent of substantive law as distinguished from pleading and practice. . . . We
therefore conclude that the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not subject
to overriding legislation, but that it is confined to practice, procedure and administration as such." Winberry v. Salisbury, supra at 245, 247, 255, 74 A.2d at 409, 410, 414.
With this pronouncement the Supreme Court of New Jersey became the first court
to declare its absolute independence of the legislature in the realm of procedure.
Judicial supremacy was judicially recognized. The rule came to be stated that "where
there is a conflict between the statute and the rules, the rules shall govern," Ward
v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 14 N.J. Super. 148, 151, 81 A2d 203. 204 CL. 1951),
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JUDICIAL RULE-MAKING: PLUs AND MINUS

No constitutional scheme which accepts judicial rule-making can
be evolved rationally without an inventory of the plus and the minus
and that only "in the absence of a controlling rule" is procedural legislation valid.
Streader v. Streader, 17 N.J. Super. 123, 127, 85 A2d 532, 534 (App. Div. 1951).
Two years later the court was confronted with a problem of allowing attorney's
fees. A judicially promulgated rule authorized such fees in the discretion of the trial
court in the face of a statute which, it was urged, expressed a contrary legislative
intent. The Attorney-General, arguing that counsel fees should not be awarded in
such a case, urged that the court should "out of comity yield to the legislative provisions as to procedure. . . ." State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 14, 95 A.2d
715, 722 (1953).
A divided supreme court found that the rule applied, holding,
moreover, that it was an abuse of discretion for the lower court not to award attorney's
fees. Answering the argument of the Attorney-General the court referred "to the
much criticized federal doctrine of judicial deference," adding, "we will do well to
avoid falling into the same error in this state. On the other hand, we must and do
realize that our work as a judicial establishment is always subject to the will of the
people; if we do not do our task well, they can and should and undoubtedly would
make such changes that they may think wise by way of constitutional amendment."
State v. Otis Elevator Co., spra at 17, 95 A.2d at 723. It is significant that the
court chose not to consider whether the statute did in fact express a legislative intent
against the payment of the counsel fees in question and, further, that it did not
consider the fact that the statute antedated the adoption of the 1947 constitution.
Thus, separation of powers in New Jersey has become a matter of very tangible fact.
Mutually exclusive realms of legislative and of judicial power extend away on either
side of the fine line that is said to separate "substance" from "procedure." Within its
separate realm, the court has declared itself responsible only "to the will of the
people." For fuller discussion see note 119 infra.
The only other states where under the governing constitutional provision a Winberry result might obtain are Michigan and Florida. The Michigan constitution of
1908 provides that "the supreme court shall by general rules establish, modify and
amend the practice in such court and in all other courts of record. The legislature
shall, as far as practicable, abolish distinctions between law and equity proceedings."
MicH. CoxsT. art. VII, § 5. Outside of this specific mandate, the legislature is not
expressly empowered to make laws governing procedure. It is perhaps surprising
under these provisions that "the promulgation of court rules by the Michigan Supreme
Court has been sporadic, piecemeal, and incomplete." Joiner & Miller, ntpra note
17 at 639. Understandably, "the vast bulk of practice regulations were created by
statute." Ibid. Which power is supreme in case of conflict between rule and procedural statute may appear to have been settled in favor of court rules by Berman v.
Psiharis, 325 Mich. 528, 39 N.W.2d 58 (1949). Compare, however, Youngs v. Peters,
118 Mich. 45, 76 N.W. 138 (1898) (court rule cannot override tax law provision
concerning when deeds may issue). Neither opinion has adequate discussion of the
problem. A recent case, People v. Stanley, 344 Mich. 530, 75 N.W.2d 39 (1956),
typified by a commentator as "a moving statement in support of the superiority of
inherent and constitutional rule-making when brought into conflict with legislative
meddling with practice," Joiner & Miller, supra note 17 at 641-42, proves upon close
reading to contain nothing whatever about judicial supremacy, and no conflict of
rule with valid statute was at issue in that case. FLA. CONsT. art. v, § 3, providing:
"The practice and procedure in all courts shall be governed by rules adopted by the
Supreme Court," appears as yet untested.
The Alaskan solution represents a compromise which secures some measure of
judicial insulation without sacrificing all power of legislative review. Article IV
of the constitution ratified in 1956 provides: "The supreme court shall make and
promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts. It shall make and
promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all
courts. These rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the
members elected to each house." ALASKA CoNsT. art. IV, § 15. Thus rule-making
power is placed firmly in the hands of the judiciary. Legislative overrule is preserved
under terms which make its exercise neither as easy as ordinary legislation nor as
difficult as constitutional amendment. Legislative tinkering is discouraged, but the
power of the elected representatives of the people is available at last resort to curb
flagrant abuse. See text at note 180 infra.
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inherent in the rule-making power. Ultimately, the checks and balances
to be built into a set of constitutional provisions, or the decision
to do without them, must reflect an attempt to maximize the potential
for good in making courts responsible " for adjective law while minimizing the risks of assigning them this authority. Thus the terms
under which rule-making may be entrusted to the courts, and the
scope and conditions of legislative veto if one is to be provided, can be
formulated only after inquiring why the vesting of rule-making power
in the judiciary is intrinsically sound, what, specifically, are the advantages promised, and what dangers or disadvantages run with the
grant. To retain the advantages while reducing the risks is to approach the ideal.
We are led to the familiar. The merits of rule-making have been
thrice-rehearsed, indeed oftener, S' so that the briefest survey will suffice.
Long ago Pound " and Wigmore
propounded convincing arguments against relying upon legislative management of judicial procedure: legislatures have neither the immediate familiarity with the
day-by-day practice of the courts which would allow them to isolate the
pressing problems of procedural revision nor the experience and expertness necessary to the solution of these problems; legislatures are
intolerably slow to act and cause even the slightest and most obviously
necessary matter of procedural change to be long delayed; legislatures
are subject to the influence of other pressures than those which seek
the efficient administration of justice and may often push through
some particular and ill-advised pet project of an influential legislator
while the comprehensive, long-studied proposal of a bar association
molders in committee; ' and legislatures are not held responsible in
the public eye for the efficient administration of the courts and hence
do not feel pressed to constant reexamination of procedural methods.
37. Some constitutional phraseology is mandatory in form, some permissive.
Under the New Jersey constitution, art. VI, § 2, 1 3, which dictates that "the Supreme
Court shall make rules" the court has written that, "the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court, however, is not a privilege to be exercised by it at its option; on the
contrary, it is a duty that the Justices of the Supreme Court must exercise as part
of their constitutional obligations in cases involving the State quite as much as in
private litigation. . .

."

State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 14, 95 A.2d 715, 722

(1953). Similarly the Maryland constitution, art. IV, § 18, directs that "it shall be
the duty of the Judges of the Court of Appeals to make and publish rules and regulations for the prosecution of appeals to said appellate court. . .

."

Cf. the less

mandatory language of Mo. CONST. art. V, § 5: "The supreme court may establish
rules of practice and procedure for all courts."
38. See note 27 supra.
39. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926);
Regulating ProceduralDetails by Rules of Court, 13 A.B.A.J. Supp. 12 (1927).
40. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Consti-

tutionally, 23

IL.

L. REv. 276 (1928).

41. Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARv. L. Rp.

28,44-45 (1952).
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Moreover, it must be remembered that a very large part of maintaining maximum effectiveness in the courts does not lie in drastic
wholesale procedural reform, but in the necessary minor alterations of
single rules from time to time as experience dictates, and such small
matters as these inevitably fare badly when they must compete for
legislative attention. Even the best codes have the defect of rigidity;
they cannot be changed without "all the pomp and circumstance of
repeal or of legislative amendment" ' and while in effect bind the
courts absolutely and without exception, even in situations where they
may work inefficient or unjust results. If the courts attempt to adapt
an antiquated or too-general rule to their current particular needs by a
process of distinction and reinterpretation, the result is uncertainty; a
few litigants will be trapped and badly injured, many more will be
forced to argue their cases on points of procedure. Codes tend to
foster litigation of procedural issues,4 since the legislature cannot clarify
by simple pronouncement whatever ambiguity may inhere in its codes
and the courts themselves can provide clarification only in the process
of adjudication. Court rules, on the other hand, are flexible in application, easy of clarification, and rapid of amendment should amendment
be required. They are the work of an agency whose whole business
is court business and for whom court efficiency can become a major interest, an agency keenly aware of the latest problems and fully capable of
bringing to bear in their early solution a long and solid experience.
"It is inconceivable," wrote Chief Justice Terrell anent the rulemaking power, "that litigants of the present who transact business by
the press of a button, .

. traverse the continent overnight by air-

plane, hop to Europe by Clipper, and spend the weekend in Miami out
of New York, would be content like Balaam, to travel the highway of
justice on the back of an ass. . . . I think we owe it to society to
hike the administration of justice off the ass. . . . " " To date

some thirty states have been trying to hike the administration of justice
off the ass with the aid of rule-making powers vested, wholly or in significant part, in their courts of last resort.45
42. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 602 (1926).
43. Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial RuleMaking, 55 MicH. L. REv. 623, 643 (1957), states that "a random comparison of
decisions by courts exercising rule-making power before and after their court rules
were adopted indicates that there are fewer decisions turning on procedural questions
after the rules were adopted."
44. Petition Fla. State Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla. R. Civ. P., 145
Fla. 223, 230, 199 So. 57, 60 (1940).
45. ABA, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE AfmiNisRAToNr OF JusTIcE 17 (3d ed.
1952); INsTTruTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE
CoURTs (1955).
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Opposition to regulation of practice and procedure by court rule
was concentrated on a few major points."' The first cluster of arguments was intended to show that the courts either could not or would
not exercise the power. This was pre-1938. There was much in
history to support that position,4 7 but by now opposition on this ground
has evaporated almost entirely.4 The record of recent experience has
been convincing: ' despite crowded dockets and backlogs, despite a
primary interest in adjudication, despite an alleged inertia and disinclination to act, courts have in fact acted and the results have not been
unworthy. The second cluster concerned a supposed inability of the
judiciary to utilize techniques, such as public hearings, which would
involve interested parties in the development and consideration of
new adjective law. Indeed, some of the literature reads as though
the new rules of procedure would emerge full-blown from a few Saturday morning conference sessions. Once again, history has laid low
these fears. This is not to suggest that the optimum in tapping all available resources-bench, bar and law schools 8o-has been finally reached.
Rather, on the Federal scene a transition is now taking place which may
be expected to improve on the Advisory Committee system by placing
the Judicial Council in a role of new prominence. " Nor should one
minimize the potential significance of such change. The important
thing, however, from the point of view of our inquiry is that, in the
46. See Warner, The Role of Courts and Judicial Councils in ProceduralReform,
85 U. PA. L. REv. 441 (1937); Sunderland, The Regulation of Procedure by Rules
Originating in the Judicial Council, 10 IND. L.J. 202 (1935); 2 REcoRns

OF THE

CON-

1943-44 To RElSE THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA 34
(1946) ; Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practice and Procedure in
Illinois, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 443, 450 (1952).
47. Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599, 600 (1926);
Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practiceand Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule-Making,
55 MicH. L. REV. 623, 639-40 (1957).
48. Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating Practice and Procedure in
Illinois, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 443, 452 (1952) ; Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil
Rules, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 435 (1958) ; Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural
Reform, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 149 (1948). There have been other objections,
not mentioned in the text, which appear likewise to have evaporated as, e.g., the
argument that "public opinion is so sharply divided on some of the more important
questions of procedural reform that for courts to settle them would bring down on
their heads a storm of criticism." Warner, supra note 46, at 448.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. These three sources of assistance were mentioned, in reverse order, by Mr.
Chief Justice Warren in a communication read by Mr. Justice Clark at a panel discussion reported in The Rule Making Function and the Judicial Conference of the
United States, 21 F.R.D. 117, 118-19 (1958).
51. Id. at 117 discussing a proposed amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 331, which section
directs, in part, that there shall be an annual Judicial Conference of the chief judges
of the judicial circuits presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States and
which "shall make a comprehensive survey of the condition of the business of the
STITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF

courts of the United States and prepare plans for the assignment of judges to or

from circuits where necessary, and shall submit suggestions to the various courts, in
the interest of uniformity and expedition of business." The statute was enacted.
Pub. L. No. 513, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 11, 1958).
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words of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, "the responsibility of the Supreme Court will not be lessened." 52 And if further evidence be
needed, Professor Moore's valuable comparison of the old and new
techniques 0 by which the Supreme Court avails itself of "an informed
judgment" on which to rely " adequately demonstrates that the differences are of small moment in terms of the basic allocation of power
between court and legislature."'
Finally, we must consider a number of objections which, taken together, challenge the fitness of supreme court judges and justices to
make the necessary policy determinations involved in rule-making.5 At
the least these would question that the best qualified individuals for
such decisions are the judges of the highest appellate bench, "many of
whom have reached an age in life when all change seems abhorrent." 57
Variations on the theme abound: judges will prefer their own convenience in such matters as requiring printed briefs to legitimate interests of litigants in reducing costs;

Z8

they are too long removed from

practice to be "in touch" with problems of the bar or, indeed, of the
trial bench; "' and they are not to be entrusted with policy decisions
which may affect "the liberties of citizens." " These arguments reflect
a constant concern that judicial rule-making will impinge on substantive rights,"' not because judges would make rules governing sub52. Tlw Rule Making Function and the Judicial Conference of the United States,
21 F.R.D. 117, 118 (1958).
53. Id. at 125-33. Professor Moore stresses that "final responsibility should
remain where it now is, in the Supreme Court." Id. at 132. The reference to "final"
responsibility, it is clear from the context, refers to the Court vis-a-vis the Judicial
Council rather than the Congress. Judge Clark lists "retention of the present authority of the Supreme Court and of the existing rule-making statutes without amendmenit' as the first of three main features of the proposal that the Judicial Council be
utilized in rule-making. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLum.
L. REv. 435, 444 (1958). And in more colorful language: "The Court as the ultimate
source of power is still the keystone of the arch." Ibid.
54. See Clark, supra note 53, at 441 and the reference to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
position at n.30.
55. A court charged with the responsibility of rule-making will, in the normal
course, seek aid in discharging that responsibility. An advisory committee is a common device. This may well be supplemented by utilizing a Judicial Council. See,
for a detailed description of the practice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the discussion in Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 253-54, 74 A.2d 406, 413 (1950). See
also State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 15, 95 A.2d 715, 722 (1953). Cf. Sunderland,
The Regulation of Procedure by Rules Originating in the Judicial Council, 10 InD.
L.J. 202 (1935): "The question whether rules of procedure should originate in a
judicial council, does not necessarily depend on whether the final authority for their
promulgation is to be the legislature or the courts."
56. Trumbull, supra note 48, at 450-52; Warner, supra note 46, at 447-51;
Sunderland, supra note 55, at 210-11.
57. Warner, supra note 46, at 451.
58. Id. at 449: "That case might be designated pocketbooks of clients v. eyesight
of supreme court justices."
59. Trumbull, supra note 48, at 451.
60. Warner, supra note 46, at 447.
61. Trumbull, supra note 48, at 451, 452.
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stantive law as such, but rather because procedure and substance are
inextricably interwoven.'
It is of undoubted significance that the proponents of these arguments rarely take the position that it is really best for legislatures to
deal with the full battery of procedural provisions, that they should
exercise detailed control over court business. Where the debate has
been formulated on a court v. legislature basis the conclusion may appear
to be in terms of complete legislative responsibility,3 yet the force of
the reasoning and the tenor of the discussion do not carry this far.
In short, it would be sufficient to meet these objections if the law
were to devise a system of concurrent jurisdiction which could assure
ultimate legislative power on those matters of policy which should be
decided by a body "subject to the popular will," "' while retaining
judicial initiative and primary responsibility in the vast range of
technical material which is the bulk of the adjective law. This is not
to suggest a technical vs. policy dichotomy; no such division will withstand analysis. It is to suggest that a system which charges the
judiciary with the responsibility for the development of adjective law
while retaining for the legislature, on appropriate terms, power to reassess and evaluate, may come close to maximizing the potential for
good in the rule-making process while minimizing the risks inherent
in it.
It becomes necessary to analyze these problems in terms of the
subject matter of rule-making, examining the specifics of that with
which courts deal, and by comparison, of that which is beyond their
ken. We turn to consider the grist of the rule-making mill.
WHAT Is PROCEDURE?

Nothing could be clearer than the fact that courts in the exercise
of the rule-making power have no competence to promulgate rules
governing substantive law. Statutes which make the point are supererogatory.
Yet virtually everyone concedes that "rational separation is
62. Ibid. Cf. statement by Joseph A. Padway, Chief Counsel, AFL, Hearings
Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on HR. 8892 and the Rules of Civil
Procedure,75th Cong., 3d Sess. 37-51 (1938). See text at note 80 infra.
63. Compare the revealing questioning of Padway, supra note 62, at 46 with id.
at 47.
64. Warner, supra note 46, at 447.
65. Heckel, Constitutional Law, Survey of the Law of New Jersey 1950-1951,
6 RuTmEs L. REv. 27, 30 (1951). Note that "while the courts necessarily make new
substantive law through the decisions of specific cases coming before them, they are
not to make substantive law wholesale through the exercise of the rule-making
power." Vanderbilt, C.J., in Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 248, 74 A.2d 406,
410 (1950).
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well-nigh impossible." 66 We propose in this section to consider the
difficulties of categorization for the primary purpose of shedding light
on our central question: what role should the legislature be assigned
with respect to rule-making? No legal litmus test with which to distinguish substance from procedure will emerge. Nor do we argue for
abandonment of the terms and the distinction. No preferable alternatives suggest themselves and new words alone are likely to compound
the confusion. Exploring the elusive line between substance and procedure is, however, rewarding in revealing factors relevant to the place
of the legislature.
Costs, Time and Venue: Policies in Procedure
In New Jersey, where rule-making power has been held to be
vested in the courts with no right of legislative veto, the supreme
court has held the taxation of attorney's fees as costs to be a matter of
procedure.67 In the face of a conflict between rule and statute a
unanimous bench disposed of the substance-procedure problem with a
single, peremptory sentence: "The taxation of costs is essentially procedural, generally affecting the remedy only." "8 Of course, in that
case only $6,500 was involved, while in England taxation of costs
against one party can run to £89,000 in a case brought for only
£40,000.9 If the power of decision be in the court exclusively a virtual
revolution in the conditions of litigation could be effected with no recourse short of constitutional amendment. Consider a lesser problem,
taxing the cost of discovery. Putting to one side stenographic charges,
often an item of substance in itself, what of the complications of distance where, e.g., New York litigants propose California depositions?
Payment of $695, including attorney's expenses of $395 and fees of
$300, was made a condition of the taking of one relatively short deposition in such a case.7" More interesting problems develop when a liti66. Rutledge, J., dissenting in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
559 (1949). Nor is the difficulty solely one of failure to recognize the different
purposes for which substance may be distinguished from procedure. We may avoid
the trap of applying doctrine developed in the context of two-state conflict of laws
situations or of Erie-spawned problems of federalism without discovering in the
"pulls" of the rule-making area sufficient basis for "rational separation."
67. John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, Inc., 3 N.J. 472, 70 A2d 767 (1949);

State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 95 A.2d 715 (1952).
68. John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, Inc., supra note 67, at 479, 70 A.2d
at 771. The opinion in State v. Otis Elevator Co., supra note 67, has a more extended
discussion of the problem.
69. Chorley, ProceduralReform in England, in DAvm DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY
ESSAYS 98, 107 (1949).

70. North AtI. and Gulf S.S. Co. v. United States, 16 F.R.S. 30bA1 Case 2
1952), aff'd, 209 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1954). The case involved S.D. AND
E.D.N.Y. RULE 4 with respect to prepayment where depositions are to be taken
over 150 miles from the courthouse. Litigation in state courts can also involve
interstate depositions. See, e.g., Solliday v. District Court, 135 Colo. 489, 313 P.2d
1000 (1957).
(S.D.N.Y.
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gant seeks to bring nine individuals from Moscow to New York and
charge the other side with the costs.7 1
Joiner and Miller argue that taxation of costs should not be within
the power of the court because it "involves something more than the
orderly dispatch of judicial business." 72 Limited to a choice between
legislature and court as repositories of ultimate power, they may be
right, but it would be a sorry thing indeed to take from the courts
the power to deal with the plethora of problems which come under the
heading of costs or to make their power depend on the terms of specific
legislative grant." This is an area where rule-making is appropriate,
efficient and desirable. In the first instance, the development of this
area should be for the courts, but it appears necessary that at some
point there be available legislative authority to override the court
where its actions reflect a policy fundamentally opposed to what the
legislators might consider to be in the significant best interests of the
people.
Even simpler problems of categorization invite confusion as
courts attempt to delineate the limits of the rule-making power. The
time within which an appeal must be taken is a matter which one
would certainly expect to be treated as "procedural." Is not this a
classic example of a provision "affecting the remedy only"? 7 The
problem, however, so bedeviled a New Jersey appellate court that
it was forced to conclude that the line between substantive law and
adjective law is not the same as that between substantive law and
procedural law because the "grant of power to make rules governing
the practise and procedure .

.

.

does not include in its scope all adjec-

tive law." 7' This statement is a model of clarity compared to an earlier
71. V. 0. Machinoimport v. Clark Equipment Co., 11 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)
(plaintiff's request for counsel fees denied). For the subsequent history of the case,
see 12 F.R.D. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
72. Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial RuleMaking, 55 Mica. L. Rxv. 623, 653 (1957). In their short six-line discussion, they
add that the taxation of costs "subsumes a fundamental decision as to how much of
the expense of litigation the state shall bear. This thus becomes a legislative problem." Ibid.
73. See the valuable Note, Use of Taxable Casts To Regulate the Conduct of
Litigants, 53 CoLurm. L. REv. 78 (1953), which explores the taxation of both costs
and expenses as a deterrent to bad faith tactics in litigation and concludes: "It may
be assumed that the congested condition of the lower courts is at least in part
attributable to this weakness in the law of costs." Id. at 93. For a consideration
of the significance of inadequate power in the court, in the context of the pre-trial
hearing, see 34 IowA L. Rav. 368, 370 (1949). Cf. PA. R. Civ. P. 217 (costs on continuance).
74. See text and note at note 68 supra. For reference to various other tests see
Joiner & Miller, supra note 72, at 630, 631.
75. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. Super. 30, 34, 68 A2d 332, 334 (App. Div. 1949),
discussed note 36 supra where the subsequent history of the case is set forth.
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pronouncement in the same opinion that, under a constitutional provision cast in terms of "procedure," it was "not enough" to find that time
for appeal was "procedural law as distinguished from substantive
law." " Taking the opinion as a whole, it seems fair to infer that, in
the court's view, there are areas of the law which must be considered
"procedural" under any acceptable definition of that term, and which,
nonetheless, present basic issues of policy properly left to the legislature.
There is much merit in this counsel of caution, particularly if it
be considered in terms of ultimate power and prerogatives. Applying
the insight of the New Jersey court to the problems of venue sheds light
in a troublesome area. Here, too, one can observe concern for maintaining legislative control over policy decisions. Joiner and Miller suggest that because the county in which "a case should be tried involves
something more than the orderly dispatch of judicial business, .
the people of the state should have the power" to determine where law
suits should be initiated.7" After determining that "initial venue is a
matter for legislative determination," the same authorities conclude
that rules governing change of venue should be treated differently; these
should be for the court. Nor is the suggestion limited to the procedure
of change, or to discretion in the individual case. Court rules should be
promulgated governing the "grounds" as well as the method of change
of venue, and the former may be based on prejudice, convenience,
((or any other cause" for these "can involve the orderly dispatch of
judicial business and should be subjects of judicial rule making." 78 If
there is reason to retain in the legislature power of decision over where
within a state relief must be sought and where criminal prosecution must
take place, it is of doubtful wisdom to invest the courts with the responsibility of determining when such policies should give way before
other considerations ranging from "convenience" to "any other cause."
Again this is not to suggest that venue should be considered outside
the scope of a court's rule-making power; 79 it is to suggest that dividing
responsibility between court and legislature by putting initial venue on
one side with change of venue on the other is undesirable. Since
the formulation and continual supervision of venue provisions is a
detailed, highly technical, yet important, task, it would again be a
happier solution for the courts to bear initial responsibility in this
area. Placing this responsibility on the courts need not, however, take
away from the legislature the power to review, to reassess and to
76.
77.
78.
79.

Ibid.
Joiner & Miller, spra note 72, at 649.
Ibid.
E.g., PA. R. Ciw. P. 1006, 1042, dealing with venue.
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revise where the major premises of the court appear to conflict with
policies which the legislators feel should be asserted.
Substantive Considerationsin the Interstices
The preceding subsection has dealt with procedural issues which,
because they were procedural, should be left in the first instance to
judicial regulation, but which, because they may have radical impact
on the community, should, in our view, be subject to legislative review.
This subsection continues the development of the same theme, with
a major point of difference. The need for legislative review in the
cases here considered arises from the fact that these procedures are so
intimately related with substantive considerations that inherent in
them is the potential of frustrating substantive policies. The criminal
law can provide illustration.
Criminal procedure, no less than civil procedure, would be encompassed within a general constitutional grant of rule-making authority. So much of the literature on judicial rule-making has focused
on problems of the civil side it becomes necessary, at times, to assert
afresh the existence of a criminal jurisdiction with such procedural
safeguards as trial by jury. There is no doubt that the mode of
criminal trial can be safeguarded by express constitutional provision, yet
a serious and respected student of constitutional revision in Pennsylvania has suggested that it might be appropriate for the judiciary to
regulate procedure thus leaving to the judges of the Supreme Court
control over trial by jury, double jeopardy and use of criminal information. "I am sure," writes a former Attorney General of the State of
Pennsylvania, "that the rights of the accused would be adequately
safeguarded if the Supreme Court were permitted to regulate all procedure by rule, and Sections 6 and 10 " could both be safely eliminated." 81 If such action were taken, an unlikely course,"' it would
furnish a further example of procedural policy concerning which the
legislature might well be given final voice. Indeed, even the existence
of a legislative veto might render its use unnecessary.
Trial by jury does more than illustrate a point already made. It
reveals an added facet of the desirability of a legislative role. It is
school-boy lore that the substantive law developed in the interstices
of procedure. Less familiar, but no less true, is the fact that sub80. Reference to PA. Coxsr. art. I, §6 (Trial by jury) and §10 (Criminal
information; twice in jeopardy).
81. Schnader, Dead Wood in the Pemwylvania Corstitution,25 TEMPn. L.Q. 399,
401 (1952).
82. Immediately preceding this statement Schnader had suggested certain rephrasing as appropriate in the event of constitutional revision. Ibid.
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stantive law continues to develop today in procedural terms. Removal
of the right to trial by jury would probably have significant impact not
only on the criminal law in action, but on important phases of the
civil law as well, and the call for eliminating the constitutional guarantee
of this mode of trial in civil cases is such that it cannot be ignored.
There is no need to multiply examples, for instances of substantive considerations secreted in procedural interstices " are well known. Yet,
to mention a few is to demonstrate that the solution cannot lie in categorizing the interstices, too, as substantive. Consider, e.g., the limits
of a directed verdict in negligence cases, the procedural effect of
presumptions and the more general field of assigning burdens of proof.8
It would be wrong to remove these areas from the general rule-making
power of the courts. Then, too, there are those procedural safeguards
of the criminal law "that have long been considered important bulwarks
of individual liberty." " Over twenty years ago Sam Bass Warner
was fearful that "some of the problems of procedural reform touch
too closely the liberties of citizens to be decided in a democracy by any
83. The reference is to the familiar passage from MAN., EARLY LAW AND
CusTom 389 (1901) : "So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy
of Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure. .. ."
84. In George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 86 A2d 8 (1952), the court
upset a jury verdict for plaintiff and ordered judgment entered for defendant, trustee
of a railroad, in the face of a statute which provided "in any action against a steam
railroad company to recover damages for injury or death occurring at any crossing
at which the company has not installed any safety gates, bell or other warning or
protective device of the kind usually employed to warn and protect the traveling public
and such injuries or death are alleged to be due to the negligence of the company,
the plaintiff shall not be nonsuited on the ground of contributory negligence on the
part of the person injured or killed, but it shall be left to the jury to determine
whether such person was exercising due . . . care. . . . "

The court found the

statute in conflict with its own rules with respect to the judge's power to withdraw
the case from the jury, held the statute to be procedural, operating "within the field
of our exclusive rule-making power . . . and therefore is superseded . . . and no

longer effective." George Siegler Co. v. Norton, supra at 383, 86 A.2d at 12. It
appears obvious that the statute, whether or not it be considered procedural, is an
attempt to give effect to substantive policies.
UNrFowm RuLE o EviDEN cE 14 sets forth the effect to be given to presumptions
and the Comment thereto considers the significance of "the substantive policy on
which the presumption is based." See also the discussion in MoRGAN, MAGTranE &
WaINsv

r, CASES oNr EviDExcE 443 (4th ed. 1957), where the burden of going

forward and the risk of non-persuasion are also referred to. For the same problem
in another area see Padway, supra note 62.
Cf. Case, J., dissenting from the position of the majority with respect to rulemaking in Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 266, 74 A.2d 406, 419 (1950), who notes
that the procedural rules are the responsibility of the supreme court and adds: "The
justices make the decision; four of them; perhaps three of them; on their own handiwork, a rule that cuts deeply into property and property rights. That decision would
be absolutely honest and highly intelligent; but that is not the whole story; it could
also be doctrinaire and arbitrary."
85. Warner, supra note 46, at 447. State v. Haines, 18 N.J. 550, 115 A.2d 24
(1955), holds that extension of the term of the grand jury is within the scope of the
rule-making power of the court. Would a statute requiring corroboration by more than
one witness in certain types of cases be procedural?
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body not subject to the popular will." 86 Others have been concerned
about mortgage moratoria legislation and labor injunctions, both areas
where procedural forms have been used to effectuate substantive
policies."
In short, here again are areas which should, in the first instance
be dealt with by way of judicial rule, although they involve policies best
left subject, at some stage, to the will of a forum closer to the people.
The Risk of Improper Categorization
At times the difficulty of delineating substance from procedure
becomes so great that a delusively attractive alternative presents itself:
abolish the terms altogether, or at least proscribe their use. Riedl, who
came to the problem in the course of considering what rules of evidence
a court might properly promulgate, found the substance-procedure distinction "impossible" and proposed to abandon it."" In our view,
the attempt was futile and must, on the whole, remain so. The quest
for definition is not the result of happenstance, of historical accident by
which an ambiguous term or an infelicitous phrase gained currency
with a resultant obfuscation of ideas. The quest stems from the need to
define an ill-defined and at times indefinable area of authority, from the
need to know with what a court may deal in discharge of its obligation
to determine how litigation shall proceed, and beyond what limits it may
not trespass. Practice and procedure are familiar terms which, in the
large, are accepted as referring to the "how" of litigation. 9 They
are neither divinely ordained nor sacrosanct, but to substitute alternatives which come no closer to expressing the limits of that authority9
is to run the risk of change which has "all the vices of novelty and none
of the virtues of lasting improvement." 91 No clearly preferable alternatives. have been forthcoming and constitutions continue to use the
familiar phrase. Consequently, it remains necessary to deal with its
meaning.
Riedl has proposed a test with which to delineate the scope of judicial authority in dealing with the law of evidence by rule. It has
86. Warner, supra note 46, at 447. See also opinion of Frankfurter, J. in
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1944): "The history of American Freedom
is, in no small measure, the history of procedure."
87. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An
Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REv. 234, 253-54 (1951).

88. Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe
Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 601, 604 (1940).
89. Joiner & Miller, supra note 72, at 630.
90. Another factor, which appeared to have concerned Riedl, supra, note 88, is
the risk that definitions appropriate to one type of problem shall improperly be carried
over to another, quite different problem. See note 66 supra for discussion of this
"trap." The problem does not, in this case, appear insurmountable.

91. Clark, supra note 53, at 451.
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been reformulated, in broader terms, by other writers who have not
abandoned the substance-procedure dichotomy. 2 Accordingly, both
tests are deserving of study in order (1) to shed further light on the
scope of the power conferred by a constitutional grant expressed in terms
of practice and procedure; (2) to deal with the important and controversial question of reforming the law of evidence by way of court
rule; 93 (3) to determine whether the difficulty in defining the judicial
rule-making power, in drawing the line in such manner that it will not
be too confining and yet not too encompassing, does not by its very
existence argue for vesting in the legislature a power of ultimate review.
For Riedl, the power of a court to promulgate a rule of evidence
depends on whether that rule "is a device with which to promote the
adequate, simple, prompt, and inexpensive administration of justice in
the conduct of a trial or whether the rule, having nothing to do with
procedure, is grounded upon a declaration of public policy." "
The difficulty with Riedl's test is in its major premise. It assumes
that the rules, even of evidence, which courts will be concerned about
categorizing, fall neatly into one of two pigeon-holes: "declaration of
public policy" or "rule to promote the prompt, inexpensive administration of justice." Nothing could be further from the truth, as is
demonstrated by the briefest glance at his conclusions concerning
specifics. Physical and mental examinations by a physician, certainly
proposed as a means of furthering adequate administration of justice,
92. Joiner & Miller, supra note 72, at 635.
93. Judge Learned Hand has been quoted as asserting that rule-makling power
with respect to evidence "has been a very contentious subject." REPoRT OF THE
COMMISSION To STUDY THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, NEW JERSEY
9 (1956). The New Jersey experience bears this out. In 1954 a committee was
appointed to report to the supreme court with respect to revision in this area. They
did so in 1955. REPORT OF THE COMMTTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
To THE SUPREME COURT OF NEw JERSEY (1955). In September, 1955, an editorial
in N.J.L.J., recognizing the problem posed in the light of the Winberry decision,
attempted to offer a constructive suggestion. After noting that "this is not the
occasion for a philosophical discourse on the distinctions between 'substance' and
'procedure,"' went on to urge that it "would be best to have the Legislature enact the
Code as an entirety, and then have the Supreme Court adopt it as a whole." How
Shall the Proposed Code of Evidence Be Adopted?, 78 N.J.L.J. 316 (1955). A
legislative commission appointed thereafter recommended a significantly different set
of provisions than that of the supreme court committee. It urged that the legislature
retain responsibility for the Evidence "Rules," and invited the supreme court to
recommend amendments to the legislature when such became necessary. REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION, supra at 11-12. See also Anl Approach to Evidence Revision, 81
N.J.L.J. 16 (1958), reporting a further proposal for joint action and stating that
"the method of implementation has been the primary obstacle."
The ABA has considered as a "matter for local determination" the question as
to whether evidence reform should be achieved by way of statute or court rule. ABA,
See,
THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTIcE 64 (3d ed. 1952).
generally, Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power
Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 482 (1940); Clapp, Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 541, 562-73 (1956).
94. Riedl, supra note 88, at 604.
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is for Riedl a matter to be determined by the legislature as involving a
While there can be no doubt that public
"General Public Policy".'
policy is involved, can it possibly be suggested that this is an issue
"having nothing to do with procedure"?
"Expert Testimony" and "Survivor's Testimony against Representatives" are similarly classified as being in the legislative domain,96 although here, too, there is ample basis for argument that the
sole policies involved are those which call for a higher order of administration of justice, a more rational resolution of facts in controversy.
When we turn to the problem of privilege we meet the classic example of
substantive law in the rules of evidence. Extrinsic policy considerations
are said to be operative and paramount. This is indeed true, but it must
not be forgotten that the orderly dispatch of litigation, with the maximum information from permitted sources made available to the tribunal, is also a consideration and is, itself, a matter of high policy. The
interplay of these factors and the need for balancing them is articulated
by Wigmore in his statement of the famous four fundamental conditions for the recognition of a privilege: "The injury that would inure to
the relation [being protected] by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation." " Furthermore, as the persistent and still current controversy over the desirability of a doctor-patient privilege so
clearly demonstrates, whenever the existence of a privilege is called into
question the issue must be resolved by balancing the advantages to be
gained by according it against the resultant loss in efficient administration of justice."
Here, again, it would appear desirable to charge the courts with
initial responsibility for reforming the law of evidence by way of rule.
The initiative should be assigned to the judiciary and the power invested
in the courts. Only in this way are we likely to achieve a simplified,
rational set of provisions controlling the trial of an issue of fact. Nor
should the courts be obliged to pick and choose among the rules.99
It would be wrong to say that, in the first instance, privilege shall be for
the legislature, but what constitutes a waiver of privilege shall be for the
courts. Aristotelian logic might be satisfied by a line so drawn, yet the
policies are too interrelated to give promise of functional success.
95. Id. at 605.
96. Ibid.
97. 8 Wxmsom, EvIENcE § 2285 (1940).
98. MCCORMICx, EVIDENCE 222-23 (1954).
99. "Since the proposed Code of Evidence was conceived and drafted as an integrated whole, and because procedure and substance are so interwoven," an editorial,
78 N.J.L.J. 316 (1955), urged adoption as a whole.
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Specific mention of evidence should be included in the constitutional
provision to avoid futile, barren disputation over the authority to deal
with evidence as a whole.'
Anything less is likely to invite indecision
or the halfhearted reform which "is worse than none at all." 101 There
is sufficient basis for considering the whole of evidence doctrine as
procedural, relative to the "how" of litigation rather than to the creation and resolution of substantive rights.'
But to say this much is not
to argue that the courts are to be invested with ultimate power in an
area so peculiarly appropriate for final determination by that branch of
government which more immediately reflects the sentiment of the
community.
What emerges, in short, is that the primary difficulty with the
substance vs. procedure dichotomy in the rule-making area is that it
forces simultaneous characterization for two very different purposes:
first, for the purpose of determining whether the court may act at all and
second, for the purpose of determining whether the legislature has
competence to review and rescind a promulgated rule. This difficulty
is of course not present where the rule-making power is by way of
legislative grant. It need not be present where the power is conferred
by way of constitutional provision, so long as the constitution proceeds
to specify the role reserved for the legislature.
There is a substantial risk in ceding too much to the legislature,
particularly if in so doing courts are to abdicate completely from the
exercise of any rule-making authority in the ceded area. The point is
illustrated in considering a reformulation of the Riedl test by Joiner and
Miller. While asserting that their version "approximates" 103 Riedl's,
Joiner and Miller propose something very different. The question
for them is whether a particular area involves "something more
than the orderly dispatch of judicial business." 'o
If it does, then
it is not an appropriate subject for treatment by court rule. The
difficulty with this position is that it excludes too much. Applied rigorously, it would exclude not only such matters as venue and costs,
but also such questions as the procedural effect of presumptions. This
is not to suggest that the proponents of the test would so apply it. Indeed, they recognize that theirs is not a formulation which should be
100. See the New Jersey experience, note 93 supra.
101. Clark, supra note 53, at 451.
102. Clapp, supra note 93, marshals an impressive array of authority and concludes
that the Uniform Rules of Evidence are entirely procedural except for a few particulars. Id. at 571. Of the two exceptions which he mentions, one concerns payment
of impartial medical experts, a fiscal matter, and the other a privilege not to speak
to police officers. Id. at 571 n.119.
103. Joiner & Miller, supra note 72, at 635.
104. Id. at 649.
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expected to answer all questions of rule-making authority. 5 The point,
however, is deserving of emphasis: if it would be wrong to cut off the
legislature from areas which are legitimate subjects of its concern, it
would be unfortunate in equal, if not in greater measure, to stultify the
grant of rule-making authority by keeping the court from utilizing
it in areas in which it could be of service.
It is important to recognize that courts themselves may be prone
to define their own authority too narrowly. As Kaplan and Greene
have pointed out, the absence of any legislative control over the judiciary may result in a niggardly view by the court of its own powers, for
to assert the right to make rules is, in such a case, to assert the right
exclusively and finally.'"
It is certainly true, on the other hand,
that a court immunized from any review of its own determinations as
to what is within its rule-making power as well as from any veto over
what it chooses to promulgate, may prove too prone to assume authority. 7 Neither alternative is a happy prospect. The possibility of
each is further reason to provide for residual powers in the legislature.
NEW

JERSEY'S NATIONAL TREND

The only state to assert for its Supreme Court uncontrolled and
uncontrollable rule-making power 108 is New Jersey."9 Wigmore,
Pound and Vanderbilt, an imposing triumvirate, can be credited with
placing that jurisdiction in the class of those which grant rule-making
power to the supreme court without the possibility of legislative veto.
To point out that membership in this class is presently limited to one
state is not to deny the influence of New Jersey's experience. On the
contrary, there is reason to believe that an influence has been exerted.
New Jersey's story is worth retelling.
The major battle ground on which are resolved differences concerning the allocation of power between the coordinate branches of
government is the constitutional convention, or its analogue. Infelicitous drafting may invite further conflict on another day in another
105. Id. at 629.
106. Kaplan & Greene, supra note 87, at 253 n.80.
107. Id. at 253.
108. The New Jersey Legislative Committee noted: "When our Supreme Court
assembles to make rules, it sits not as a court of justice, but as a law-making body.
. . . Indeed this special law-maling assembly has advantages that the other does

not
can
and
See

possess; for its acts are not subject to veto; and the seven men who compose it
don their judicial robes and render judgment on the extent of their own powers
the validity of their own acts." REPoRT oF THE ComnmIssO , supra note 93, at 10.
also statement of Case, J., note 84 supra.
109. See note 36 supra.
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forum,:" but even without the express invitation of ambiguity or lacuna no victory gained in the formulation of the instrument can
be considered safe until finalized by judicial construction in the course
of litigation. Nor can court opinion be considered the very last word
so long as dissent invites reappraisal and the criticism of the commentators invites amendment. New Jersey has been involved with all
three phases. We turn, first, to the Constitutional Convention of 1947.
A preliminary draft of the provision in question, proposed by the
Committee on the Judiciary and circulated by it, read: "The Supreme
Court shall, subject to law, make rules governing the administration
and the practice and procedure in all the courts in the State." "
Arthur T. Vanderbilt attempted to persuade the Committee to change
the draft in favor of a grant of rule-making power unfettered by threat
of legislative reversal. He viewed the words "subject to law" as imposing legislative control on the court and urged that they be deleted." 2
In the course of his argument to the Committee, Vanderbilt asserted
that "The trend throughout the United States has been to confide the
rule-making power to the highest court and to hold that court responsible for results." 1
The words "subject to law" were not deleted, although their
position in the paragraph was altered so that it read: "The
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all
courts in the State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in
all such courts." "" Three years later Arthur Vanderbilt, now Chief
Justice of New Jersey, took occasion to interpret the key phrase in the
Speaking for the court,
leading case of Winberry v. Salisbury."
110. In Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 243, 74 A.2d 406, 408 (1950), the
majority opinion found the governing provision to be "not only ambiguous, but
elliptical." Kaplan & Greene, supra note 87, at 246, suggest that the New Jersey
provision "is not a model of clear drafting." See also the problems invited by the
language of the Alaska constitution, discussed infra note 162.
111. Tentative Draft of Judicial Article, g II, par. 3, 2 N.J. CoNsT. CONVENNol
op 1947, at 1167 (1951).
112. Letter of Arthur T. Vanderbilt, 4 id. at 729.
113. Ibid.
114. N.J. CoNsT. art. VI, §2, par. 3. The Judiciary Committee in its report,
oF 1947, at 1180, 1190 (1951), and by the statement of its
2 N.J. CoNsT. CoNVENToI
vice-chairman on the floor of the convention in the course of presenting the article made
it abundantly clear that the legislature was to "have power . . . to alter those rules of
practice [promulgated by the court] analogous to the power now possessed by the
Congress of the United States." 1 id. at 146-47. For discussion of the relevant
material and evaluation of its treatment by the majority in Winberry v. Salisbury,
see Kaplan & Greene, supra note 87, at 241-45.
115. 5 N.J. 240, 74 A2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950). Winberry
brought suit to expunge an alleged libel against himself from the records of a grand
jury. Judgment was entered for defendant and plaintiff appealed within the period
provided by statute, but after the forty-five days allowed by rule of the supreme
court. The appellate division dismissed the appeal and the supreme court affirmed.
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Vanderbilt once again asserted the same trend," 6 this time as part of
the argument devoted to demonstrating "' that "subject to law" meant
subject to substantive law, that practice and procedure had been placed
in the hands of the court "both initially and finally," 118 that the legislature had been stripped of its former power to override.
The Winberry case has been debated extensively." 9 A particularly
valuable article by Kaplan and Greene analyzes the majority opinion
carefully not only in terms of the history of the crucial phrase and its
meaning in context, but also in terms of the policy factors against which
Treating gently the matter of trends,
the result must be measured."
Kaplan and Greene suggest that " 'Trends,' like beauty, lie mostly in the
eye of the beholder; but for ourselves, we find no observable groundswell
for the idea that the legislature should be barred from final competence
to regulate court procedure. Rather we find a growing recognition of
the soundness of the policy of vesting comprehensive rule-making power
in the courts, with accountability in the last analysis to the legislature." "2 Certainly, this represents accurately the history of rule-making
Case, J. concurred on the ground that the "initial authority to make rules lay with
the court," apparently relying on the fact that the statute in question had antedated
the 1947 constitution. Id. at 255, 74 A.2d at 414, Heher, J. dissented without opinion.
116. 5 N.J. at 253, 74 A.2d at 413.
117. Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARv. L. REV.
28, 29 (1952), refers to the interpretation of "subject to law" as a holding. Heckel,
supra note 65, at 27 considers this dictum, adding "although it has been stated that
our judiciary will not render advisory opinions, the decision of the Supreme Court
in Winberry v. Salisbury is actually one." Ibid. Kaplan & Greene, supra note 87,
at 239, say that the answer to the meaning of the phrase "subject to law" was given
"in considered dictum if not in holding."
The source of the dictum v. holding controversy is to be found in the fact that
the statute in question antedated the 1947 constitution and the supreme court had
already held in John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, 3 N.J. 472, 70 A.2d 767 (1950)
(attorney's fees), that the rules promulgated on the effective date of the 1947 constitution "superseded the preexisting law, statutory or otherwise." John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, supra at 478, 70 A.2d at 771.
118. 5 N.J. at 266, 74 A.2d at 419.
119. Kaplan & Greene, supra note 87; Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court
in New Jersey, 66 HAgv. L. REv. 28 (1952); Heckel, Constitutional Law, Survey of
the Law of New Jersey 1950-1951, 6 RuTGERs L. REv. 27, 29-30 (1951) ; 99 U. P.A. L.
REv. 418 (1950); 36 IowA L. REv. 569 (1951); 24 Tzxau. L.Q. 477 (1951); 31
B.U.L. REv. 97 (1951).
Since Winberry the New Jersey courts have had a number of occasions to hold
statutes superseded by rule of court, simply reiterating Vanderbilt's view as settled
law and evidencing so little concern with the date of the statute as to fail to have it
appear in the opinion. Senst v. Senst, 14 N.J. Super. 317, 82 A.2d 204 (App. Div.
1951) ; George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 86 A2d 8 (1952) ; State v. Ahrens, 25
N.J. Super. 201 95 A.2d 755 (App. Div. 1953). In Columbia Lumber & Millwork Co.
v. DeStefano, 12 N.J. 117, 95 A.2d 914 (1953), Brennan, J., writing for the New Jersey
Supreme Court, applied the rule of Winberry without further analysis to hold a
1949 statute of no effect to the extent that it conflicted with a 1948 court rule. For
other New Jersey cases see note 36 spra.
120. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making:
An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REv. 234 (1951).
121. Id. at 251.
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in this country over the past quarter century and the current state of
authorities.'
It is true that there is perceptible movement in the
direction of giving courts power without accountability in the area of
"administration," a subject which will be separately treated.'M It is
also true that Wigmore in a famous editorial, 4 variously characterized,' and Pound in writings cited in Winberry 12 as well as in a
reply to Kaplan and Greene in defense of Winberry, 2 7 support the desirability of Vanderbilt's conclusion. It is necessary to consider the
major points of the majority and concurring opinions.
In evaluating alternative schemes of allocating power between the
courts and the legislature as a problem in constitutional revision, we
may put to one side those arguments which turn on the history of the
language in New Jersey's governing provision as well as other factors
present in, but limited in significance to, the particular case. To the
extent that the particular words chosen by the draftsman have been held
to imply a particular result, we may be interested in selecting them or
avoiding them in the course of future drafting, but that they can constitute no aid in resolving the problem of allocation viewed as a normative question, is clear. Also putting to one side arguments in favor of
rule-making generally and those strictly in rebuttal, two affirmative
points emerge frotm the majority position. First is the argument that
since the judges of the Supreme Court are charged with the rule-making
obligation, they are not merely authorized to make rules but are mandated to do so," s and they alone should bear the responsibility so that
they may be held accountable.'
Second is the argument that the rulemaking power must be viewed as continuous, that it would be intolerable
and inconsisent with the general plan of the New Jersey Constitution
for the legislature to remove from the competence of the court particular
areas of procedure, a result which must follow from legislative intervention since no mechanism is available, short of legislative repeal of the
overriding statute, to reintroduce into the ken of the court an area once
122. See note 36 supra; IxrsTuTE or JuDiciAL ADmIxisTRATiON, RULE-MARING
PowEa OF Tnm COuRTs passim (1955).
123. See text beginning at note 158 infra.
124. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void ConStutionally, 23 ILL. L. RExv. 276 (1928).
125. Kaplan & Greene, supra note 120, at 251, alter describing the title of Wigmore's editorial as "temerarious," suggest that his "omnibus argument is better taken
as the jeu d'esMrit of a master than as a serious constitutional analysis." Pound,
supra note 117, at 37, takes issue with this characterization and terms Wigmore's
article a "serious and well-grounded proposition." Cf. Joiner & Miller, supra note 72,
at 629, who conclude that "theory must give way to reality."
126. 5 N.J. at 254-55, 74 A.2d at 413.
127. Pound, supra note 117.
128. See note 37 supra.
129. 5 N.J. at 253, 74 A.?d at 413.
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removed legislatively. The suggestion that the legislature might act
to override the court, with the court remaining competent by further
rule to override the legislature, a situation which may be developing in
Missouri, 30 is rejected as intolerable. 1
There is merit to both of these points made by the court, but
it appears to us that they need not call for what Mr. Justice Case has
characterized as placing practice and procedure "within the court's unresponsible creation and control." "a2 If the legislature is to be accorded power to act, certainly there ought to be constitutional provision
for the reacquistion of initiative by the court. Similarly, the court can,
in a very real sense, be held accountable and be in fact responsible for
procedural law if the conditions of legislative intervention are such as
to discourage tinkering with detail and meddling with anything less
than compelling matters of policy. Where the legislature has felt obligated to interpose its judgment on a question which rises to this level of
significance, it should be the responsibility of the court to continue to
fashion a procedural system which operates efficiently consistent with
such policy. To ask this much is to do no more than to maintain a
proper sense of perspective, distinguishing between techniques and basic
policy considerations. How this may be accomplished is considered
below.las
Mr. Justice Case wrote a concurring opinion in Winberry which,
for purposes of the problem here being considered, was a dissent. He
makes a telling point which has validity beyond the confines of the
particular litigation. "Constitutions are not made," he suggests, "and
ought not to be construed, upon the hypothesis that men presently or
prospectively in office will continue indefinitely to function in their
particular capacities." 134 In short, a sense of historical perspective is
imperative. After all, it is a constitution which we are attempting to
fashion. Certainly it is true that the history of procedural reform in
this century has been, primarily, a history of rule-making by courts.
130. See note 36, supra. Compare S.D. CODE § 32.0902 (1939) which provides
in part: "Nothing in this section shall abridge any power the Legislature may have
to enact, amend, or repeal statutes or rules of court relating to pleading, practice,
or procedure, nor shall anything herein abridge the power of the court hereafter to
promulgate further, or to amend, or repeal any such statute the Legislature may
have enacted, amended, or repealed, or to make such new or additional rules or
amendments of its existing rules as it may elect."
131. 5 N.J. at 244, 74 A.2d at 408.
132. Id. at 266, 74 A.2d at 419.
133. See text at note 180 infra.
134. 5 N.J. at 264, 74 A.2d at 418. See also the conclusion in 99 U. PA. L.
RTv. 418, 421 (1950): "[Y]et, case law outlives those who make it, and conceivably
future supreme courts in New Jersey will be as conservative as the instant one is
progressive. This would result, under the present interpretation of the constitution,
in a procedural moratorium imunuized to the will of the people."
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But this has not always been the case. The major advance in this
country during the nineteenth century was by way of legislative enactment, beginning with David Dudley Field's code which, after its adopThere is no
tion in New York, literally swept over the country.'
need here to rehearse the difficulties in which code pleading and code
The
practice soon became embroiled; the history is familiar enough.'
point to be made is that there have been times when reform through
the courts was unthinkable, when stodginess and conservatism ruled
the bench.117 These may be unlikely to return, but it would be wrong
to foreclose the possibility of legislative action should the unlikely eventuate. The opinion in Winberry may be viewed as a reaction to an
obstreperous legislature which three short years after the adoption of the
new constitution in New Jersey, was already threatening to render
judicial rule-making impotent.' 38 The risk of the obstreperous is inherent in democratic living; it may be minimized by conditioning the
use of power. It should not serve as sufficient reason for a skewed view
of the proper vesting of ultimate controls.
THE DOMAIN OF EXCLUSIVE JUDICIAL POWER

Grant the necessity for concurrent jurisdiction in the field of procedure, immediately another problem presents itself. Should there not
be some realm of judicial administration entirely free from legislative
supervision? Or shall the legislature be permitted to dictate to the
135. Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENIENARY EssAYs 55, 58 (1949); Mitchell, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in
DAVID DunrDy FIELD CENTENARY EssAYs 73 (1949).

136. By 1878 New York's relatively simple Field Code had grown into a grotesque giant which Field himself condemned as a "monstrosity." Quoted in Mitchell,
supra note 135, at 74. By 1880 it had close to 3500 sections, a few hundred shy of
ten-fold increase in a generation. Ibid. What followed was a "history of code
tinkering." Clark, supra note 135, at 61.
137. Speaking of Field, Clark writes: "Presumably he never thought of action
through the courts; there was no reason why he should in the light of the habits of
the day." Clark, supra note 135, at 58. And, more persuasively, "had he [thought
of working through the courts], he would have realized how hopeless was then this
approach." Ibid. See also the statement quoted in note 134 supra.
It is interesting to note that for nearly a year after Congress had passed the 1934
Act authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil procedure the Court
took no action "and seemed oblivious to the charge committed to it." Clark, Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rudes, 58 CoLrum. L. REV. 435, 438 (1958). Indeed, as
one commentator observed, "that the court should accept its duty passively would
have been the traditional thing in view of the experience in several states." Editoral, Dramatic Protouncement by Chief Justice Hughes, 19 J. A.m. JuD. Soc'Y 3
(1935). For the Michigan experience of "sporadic, piecemeal, and incomplete'
exercise of the rule-making function by the court see note 36 supra. Examples
could be multiplied, not excluding New Jersey. See Kaplan & Greene, supra note
120, at 252.
138. For discussion of some of the legislative conflicts, as well as an attempt to
override Winberry by constitutional amendment see id. at 251-53. See also note 180
infra. For more recent conflict see discussion of the New Jersey experience with
respect to evidence, supra note 93.
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courts every detail of their internal regimen: command appellate courts
to issue written opinions in every case, 39 declare within what time
cases shall be heard, 40 deny to the court the power to issue its mandate
until a prescribed period of time after judgment shall have elapsed? 14
There are spheres of activity so fundamental and so necessary to a
court, so inherent in its very nature as a court, that to divest it of its
absolute command within these spheres is to make meaningless the
very phrase judicial power.
It is significant that even under constitutions which make no express grant of rule-making power to the judiciary and which have been
held to sanction extensive and overruling legislative control of court
practice and procedure, an area of strict judical immunity has been consistently recognized." 4 Throughout a long history dominated by what
Pound has called "the idea of legislative omnicompetence," '1 court
after court has nevertheless declared invalid under the several constitutions legislative enactments said to pass "the limit which separates
the legislative from the judicial power" '4" and to constitute a "palpable
encroachment upon the independence" of the judiciary.'" The rationale
of these cases is demonstrated by the opinion in Burton v. Mayer,146 a
case in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals refused to be bound by
a statute which purported to deny it the right to issue its mandate
immediately in a case already decided and where delay might well render
the judgment futile. Said the court: "The grant of judicial power to
the courts carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make
that power effective in the administration of justice under the Constitution." 147 This theme is expanded upon in other cases which
emphasize the fundamental scheme of separation of powers and the
judging,
corollary proposition that judges may not be inhibited from
48
from the effective resolution of justiciable controversies.
139. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859); Vaughan v. Harp, 49 Ark. 160, 4
S.W. 751 (1887).
140. Schario v. State, 105 Ohio St 535, 138 N.E. 63 (1922); Atchison T. &
S.F. Ry. Co. v. Long, 122 Okla. 86, 251 Pac. 486 (1926).
141. Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky. 263, 118 S.W.2d 547 (1938).
142. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImiTATiONS 175-94, 356 (8th ed. 1927), and
cases cited therein. Cases also collected in Annot., 110 A.L.R. 22, 33-38 (1937).
143. Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 H. v. L. REV.
28, 34 (1952).
144. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
145. Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859).
146. 274 Ky. 263, 118 S.W.2d 547 (1938).
147. Id. at 266, 118 S.W.2d at 549.
148. State ex rel. Watson v. Merialdo, 70 Nev. 322, 329, 268 P.2d 922 (1954),
held unconstitutional a statute which conditioned the payment of a judge's salary
on the filing of an affidavit by the judge that no matter submitted to him within
ninety days remained undecided. The court found it of moment that neither forfeiture
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Similarly, in Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Long"1 4 the validity
of a statute which provided that in a certain type of tax assessment proceedings the district court should try the cause within ten days after
answer was in question. Noting that the effect of such a provision
would be to deny to the courts discretion to grant a continuance, whatever the exigencies confronting a particular litigant, and thus perhaps
prevent judicial adjudication of a controversy otherwise within the
competence of the court, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held the
statute invalid. An act which "in any manner limits or restricts the
judicial arm of the government in properly exercising its discretion in
discharging the duties imposed upon it by the Constitution . . . is
void and must fall. . .

No one will deny that the legislative arm of

the government has the power to alter and regulate the procedure in
both law and equity matters, but for it to attempt to compel the courts
to give a hearing to a particular litigant at a particular time, to the exclusion of others who may have an equal claim upon its attention,
strikes a blow at the very foundation of constitutional government." 15o
We do not pause to evaluate the results reached in particular cases.
What the holdings do suggest is that there is a third realm of judicial
activity, neither substantive nor adjective law, a realm of "proceedings
nor diminution was involved; fighting delay in judging with delay in paying was
coercive and improper as legislative interference with the judiciary. Similarly,
State ex rel. Kostas v. Johnson, 224 Ind. 540, 69 N.E.2d 592 (1946), held invalid a
legislative attempt to deal with the law's delay, this time by the device of denying a
judge jurisdiction over any cause which remained undecided for ninety days and in
which an appropriate petition shall have been filed by one of the parties. The opinion
notes that legislation "forbidding" courts to hold any issue for longer than a specified
period is normally construed as "directory only" and, having no mandatory effect, is
constitutionally unobjectionable. Both the Merialdo and the Johnson cases reason
from the premise of constitutional separation of powers. See also cases cited notes
153-55 infra and the oft-cited -discussion in RoTTscHAEF., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 48-49 (1939).
Particularly strildng is State ex rel. Bushman v. Vandenberg, 203 Ore. 326,
280 P.2d 344 (1955), in which the court held unconstitutional a statute providing for
automatic disqualification of a judge upon application of a party. Finding that,
under the terms of the statute, disqualification was at the will of a litigant based on
"good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all," id. at 337, 280 P.2d at 348, the court
held the legislative enactment void as contravening "the principle of the separation
of powers." Id. at 341, 280 P.2d at 350. See also McConnell v. State, 227 Ark. 988,
302 S.W2d 805 (1957), which held void a rather extreme statute dealing with
continuances.
Compare the reasoning in two cases upholding judicial power over appointment
of personnel: In re Appointment of Clerk of Court of Appeals, 297 S.W.2d 764
(Ky.(1955).
1957) and
County
v. State
rel concern
Fifer, 234a public
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which are so vital to the efficient functioning of a court as to be
beyond legislative power." "' This is the area of minimum functional
integrity of the courts, "what is essential to the existence, dignity and
functions of the court as a constitutional tribunal and from the very
fact that it is a court." "2 Any statute which moves so far into this
realm of judicial affairs as to dictate to a judge how he shall judge 15
or how he shall comport himself in judging:"" or which seeks to surround the act of judging with hampering conditions '5 clearly offends
the constitutional scheme of the separation of powers and will be held
invalid.
We need not survey the total range of subjects held to fall within
this field, nor do we deal with specialized problems such as admission
to the practice of the law and the discipline of persons so admitted, prob151. Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala. 604, 607, 21 So. 2d 827, 829 (1945). The statute
in this case was not held invalid.
152. Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635, 636 (1935).
Cf. the test applied in Ex parte Shenck, 65 N.C. 353, 368 (1871). Holding valid a
statute regulating the disbarment of attorneys, the court writes: "The recent act
above referred to does not take away any of the inherent powers of the courts, which
are absolutely essential in the administration of justice, and is not such an encroachment upon the rights of the judicial department of the government as to warrant us
in declaring it unconstitutional and void." And see Paul, The Rule-Making Power
of the Courts, 1 WAsH. L. REV. 223, 231 (1926).

153. It has been held that a statute declaring a particular type of document conclusive evidence of the facts to which it attests is void as "an intrusion into the functions of the judicial department." Gordon v. Lowry, 116 Neb. 359, 217 N.W. 610,
611 (1928); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Raines, 171 Ga. 154, 155 S.E. 484 (1930);
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); accord, State v. Atkinson,
271 Mo. 28, 195 S.W. 741 (1917). The legislature may not prescribe a period of
time after decision within which a mandate may not issue. Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky.
263, 118 S.W.2d 547 (1938). It has also been held that the legislation may not prohibit the directing of a verdict, Thoe v. Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry. Co., 181 Wis.
456, 195 N.W. 407 (1923), nor prescribe by law that it shall be the duty of the court
in any case of doubt as to the construction of a statute creating a lien, to so construe
it as to give the person claiming the lien the full amount of his claim. Meyer v.
Berlandi, 39 Minn. 438, 40 N.W. 513 (1888). See opinion of Justice Fairfield in
Burt v. Williams, 24 Ark. 91, 94 (1863): "A legislative act is an annunciation by
the legislative authority that certain results shall follow particular actions or conditions; but the ascertainment of the act or condition and the application of the consequences belong to the courts." Note that our concern is with the rationale of these
cases rather than with the question of whether the correct result has been reached in
applying the general principles to individual situations.
154. Some courts have held that the legislature may not by statute require a court
to write syllabi to its opinions, In re Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83, 20 N.E. 513 (1889) ; nor
compel the court to write opinions in every case, Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24
(1859) ; Vaughan v. Harp, 49 Ark. 160, 4 S.W. 751 (1887) ; Ocampo v. Cabahigis,
15 Phil. 626 (1910).
155. The legislature may not fix a time within which a court must hear a cause,
Schario v. State, 105 Ohio St. 535, 138 N.E. 63 (1922) ; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Co. v. Long, 122 Okla. 86, 251 Pac. 486 (1926), nor appoint nor provide for the
appointment of assistants to the justices of the supreme court, State ex rel. Hovey
v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244 (1889), nor prescribe for the court what shall
constitute a sufficient brief on appeal, Solimito v. State, 188 Ind. 170, 122 N.E. 578
(1919); Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 127 N.E. 441, 128 N.E. 353 (1920). Also
see authorities cited note 148 srupra.
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lems which may deserve independent constitutional treatment.I"6 We
recognize that the outer boundaries of this sphere of total judicial autonomy have been difficult to locate with precision. 5' Suffice that such
a place of sanctuary exists and that whenever courts have felt themselves too tightly pressed by legislative regulation they have found
in the doctrine of judicial independence a large reservoir of integral
supremacy. A constitutional draft which expressly reserves ultimate
authority over procedure to the legislature need not be feared as sanctioning legislative invasion of this last judicial stronghold. It is beyond
procedure. So long as a constitution maintains the fundamental separation of powers this area of functional independence of the judiciary
will be preserved in the very grant of the judicial power. And within
it the courts remain the vigilant watchdogs of their own freedom.
ADMINISTRATION

Several of the more recently drafted constitutions, however, go
further and expressly set aside another large terrain as the exclusive
domain of the courts. The New Jersey Constitution of 1947 gives to
the supreme court power to "make rules governing the administration
of all courts and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such
courts." 1I8 Whatever may have been the intent of the drafters concerning supremacy in the field of procedure, it is evident that the grant
of power over "administration" is complete and unqualified." 9 The
5
Puerto Rico Constitution,"'
the proposed Illinois Judicial Amend"
ment, ' and perhaps the Alaskan Constitution 162 grant to their respective highest courts a similar authority: power without review in the
area of "administration." What these grants represent, apparently, is
constitutional recognition of the modern unified court system. They
comprehend a power over matters which are not "procedural" in the
156. For varying provisions see N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, 13 (exclusive power
in the supreme court over admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted) ; PHIL. CoNsT. art VIII, § 13 (concurrent jurisdiction with legislative
supremacy in the matter of admission to the practice of law).
157. 1 COOLFY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 179 (8th ed. 1927).
158. NJ. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2, 3.
159. See 5 N.J. at 256-57, 74 A.2d at 414-15 (Case, J. concurring) ; Committee on
the Judiciary Report, 2 Nmv JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947, at 1180

(1951).
160. P.R. CoNsr. art. V, § 7.
161. Iii. Const. ProposedAienndinent art. VI, § 2, ILL. ANN. STAT. (Supp. 1957).
162. ALAsrA CoNsT. art. IV, §§ 15, 16. Note the ambiguity in § 15 as to whether
all court-made rules, or only those governing practice and procedure, are subject to
legislative overrule. Other constitutions containing no such sweeping grant of general
"administrative!' power specifically provide for the assignment of judges in all courts.

CAr. CoNsT. art. VI, § la (1926) (Judicial Council); MD. CoNsT. art. IV, § 18A
(1943) (Chief. Justice as "administrative head of the judicial system" subject to rules
of the Court of Appeals) ; Mo. CoNST. art. V, § 6; see N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 7, 111,2.
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sense that the latter treat of the procedures involved in bringing a
particular case to adjudication, but which are concerned rather with
the internal organization of large and complex systems of courts.
They establish a scheme whereby the chief justice of a state, or the
highest court of the state, is responsible for the efficient, businesslike
operations of all state courts, and to this end they vest in that high
authority powers which include the assignment of particular judges to
specialized duties, the temporary assignment of judges to courts other
than their own to equalize work-loads, the assignment of one judge's
What it is important to
cases to another judge to equalize dockets.'
investigate at this point is whether this area of "administration" is
rather in the nature of the inviolable sphere of necessary judicial autonomy discussed above or whether it more nearly shares with the area
of "procedure" qualities which make desirable a reservation of ultimate
legislative authority within it.
What then is "administrative" power? The apparent clarity of the
term "administration" is deceptive. How far does it extend? What
does it exclude? While the general area of its import is apparent, it is
a concept almost infinitely extensile. A monograph published by the
Governor's Committee on Preparatory Research for the New Jersey
Constitutional Convention of 1947 bears the title: "Judicial Administration." After discussing "Rules of Practice and Procedure", "A
Business Office for the Courts", "Judicial Control over Non-Judicial
Officers Concerned with the Administration of Justice", and "The
Judicial Council", its author concludes, "a discussion of judicial administration is not complete without consideration of the rules of grand
and petit juries, the prosecutor's office, the desirability of public defenders, probation departments, specialized courts to deal with small
causes, domestic relations, juvenile offenders and the like, the coordination of the work of courts and other governmental agencies, as for
example police courts and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and
numerous other topics. Few, if any of these subjects are proper for
treatment in a Constitution. The salient changes in judicial administration suitable and eligible for constitutional consideration are the
items which have been dealt with under the main headings, to which
this report is accordingly confined." 14 It will be noted that although
163. VANDERBILT, Minmum STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION 34-35
(1949).
164. Schnitzer, Judicial Administrtiom, in N.J. GovERNoi's COmm. ON PREPARATORY RESEARCH FOR THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MoNOGRAPHS, F

VII 10-11 (1947). For the range of subject matters sometimes included in various uses
of the word "administration" see also ABA, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADmINISTRATIoN oF JusTIcE 22, 28-29 (3d ed. 1952) ; Burton, "Juaging Is Also Administratioie':
An Appreciatimo of Coutructive Leadership, 33 A.B.A.J. 1099 (1947).
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the report is so confined, the constitutional grant in terms is in no way
similarly confined. "Administration of the courts" cannot mean
merely the power of assignment of judges, for this power is specifically
vested in the Chief Justice by another section of the Judicial Article. 6"
It cannot mean merely the power to maintain a general business office
for the courts; this too is specifically provided elsewhere."0 6 But the
problem is not merely one of the word. At its narrowest plausible
definition "administration" remains a field so wide that to entrust it to
the exclusive power of the judiciary is palpably unwise. The operative
General Rules of Administration of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
provide that the Supreme Court, the Superior Court, the County
Courts and the District Courts shall sit from 10 A.M. to 1 P.M.
and from 2 P.M. to 4 P.M. 1

7

They declare upon what days the

court shall sit,' and establish the period of summer vacation of
all courts.'
If it should become essential in the public interest
that a court be available in the evening, should not the legislature
have power to make this change? If the judicially favored schedule
of long summer recess should prove unsatisfactory to the public
needs, should not the legislature have power to override judicial recalcitrance and provide for a summer-sitting court? It is not suggested
that the legislature should, or would, accept an active supervisory
role in court affairs, require weekly reports from judges, declare that
upon this particular day courts shall remain open until five. Such detailed regulation might well be rejected by the courts as an encroachment upon judicial independence, an invasion of the realm of functional integrity of the courts.' ° Clearly a balance must be struck; and
the courts will not hesitate to invoke the separation of powers doctrine
to maintain their own living space. But independence requires no such
immunity as would remove from the legislature all power to adjust the
state courts to the important needs of the people of the state. The New
Jersey General Rules of Administration now provide that motions, conferences and pretrial hearings shall be held in open court,' 7 ' that judge's
chambers shall, if possible, be in the courthouses, 17 - that the clerks of
165. N.J. CoNsT. art. VI, § 7, 2.
166. N.J. CoNsT. art. VI, § 7, 1 1.
167. N.J. RuLE 1:28-1.
168. N.J. RUIE 1:28-2.
169. N.J. RULE 1:28-4.
170. We view as insubstantial the possible argument that an affirmative grant of
legislative supremacy over "administration" operates to override the grant of judicial
power which assures the courts an absolute independence within the realm necessary
to their judicial functioning. In the ultimate, it will be for the courts to establish
the boundaries of their necessary, integral immunity.
171. N.J. RuLE 1:28-6.
172. N.J. RuLE 1:28-7.
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court shall, in all cases which have been pending for six months without proceedings, give notice of a motion by the court to dismiss for
want of prosecution.17 3 These rules are no doubt excellent. But they
imply that the court might, with equal freedom from legislative review,
order that all such hearings be heard in chambers, that the judge's
chambers shall not be in the courthouse, that a court motion for dismissal as inactive shall be noticed after six weeks. At the very least
it must be admitted that somewhere within the expansive confines of
"administration" there lie problems whose solutions require decisions of
significant public policy. Such decisions, although they are to be made
in the first instance by the court, should certainly be subject to ultimate
review by the politically responsible members of the legislature.17 4
This is not to argue that the courts should have no power of selfadministration. On the contrary, the astonishing record of judicial
reform in New Jersey over the past ten years 7-5gives persuasive evidence of the immense benefits to be gained from a unified, centralized
and streamlined court system. The application to the judicial arm of
"principles of business management" '17 has paid rich dividends of rapid
and efficient justice. It is as necessary to an effective system of courts
that it control its own administration as that it control its own practice
We must not deprive it of that power. But as with
and procedure.
practice and procedure, we are not forced to elect between the equally
undesirable alternatives of absolute judicial control and absolute legislative control. There is a middle scheme that holds out all of the advantages of judicial autonomy while severely minimizing its collateral
dangers. This is the scheme of concurrent jurisdiction: granting to
the courts full authority of initiative self-regulation, reserving to the
In fact, just as in "prolegislature an ultimate voice to curb abuse.'
173. N.J. RuLE 1:30-3.
174. Supreme court judges in New Jersey are appointed for an initial seven
year term and upon reappointment hold their offices during good behavior. N.J.
CoNsT. art. VI, J 6, [1, 3. In Pennsylvania judges of the supreme court serve for
twenty-one years and are ineligible for reelection. PA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
175. Brennan, After Eight Years: New Jersey Judicial Reform, 43 A.B.A.J.
499 (1957) ; Karcher, New Jersey Streamlines Her Courts, 40 A.B.A.J. 759 (1954) ;
Vanderbilt, Our New Judicial Establishment; The Record of the First Year, 4
RuTGEas L. REv. 353 (1950) ; Vanderbilt, Record of the New Jersey Courts in the
Sixth Year, 9 Ruras L. REv. 489 (1955).
176. Brennan, Does Business Have a Role in Improving JudicialAdministration?,
28 PA. B.A.Q. 238 (1957).
177. Section of Judicial Administration, Committee on Judicial Administration,
Report, 63 A.B.A. REP. 530, 532 (1938). Whether a supreme court charged with
responsibility for the administration of the judicial system should have the power to
fix the number of judges is an interesting question which need not be resolved here.
178. 1 STORY, CONSTITUTION 393 (5th ed. 1891) : "But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of government and maintain that that separation
is indispensable to public liberty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense.
It is not meant to affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and
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cedure," the very difficulty of definition and categorization of the
"administrative" realm argues for a scheme of concurrent jurisdiction.
Where shadowy boundaries are used to delineate spheres of exclusive
power, litigation is common, mistakes inevitable and irrevocable.
Courts may overleap themselves without recall and make final determinations of policy best left to the legislature. Or, from fear of just
such overleap, the courts may altogether decline to act in questionable
border areas. But where power is concurrent, the difficulty of drawing
boundary lines becomes less disastrous. If "procedure" and "administration" are both to be spheres wherein the court and legislature have
a common authority, no distinction need be made between them. And
even the boundary which separates this concurrent realm from the
realm of "substance" becomes less hazardous where the only difference
in terrain is that on one side the terms under which legislative power is
to be available are somewhat different than the terms which surround
the same power on the other side. So long as legislative review is
possible within the area of court power, the court will be less hesitant in
giving wide and effective sweep to its own power. And should it err,
the legislature holds a higher power of redress.
But the mere words concurrent jurisdiction' are no talismanic
phrase to solve all problems. A final, fundamental question remains.
Ultimate power by its exercise becomes immediate.

"Power .

. is

of an encroaching nature." M7 How are we to insure the maintenance
of the delicate balance of power that we have established?
THE CONDITIONS

OF LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION

Positing faithful adherence to a constitutional scheme of judicial
initiative there should be little risk of an outright legislative powergrab. That such gross usurpation of authority is not an altogether
impossible contingency, however, is attested to by the history of New
Jersey under its current Judicial Article.'
But the real danger is
distinct and have no common link of connection -or dependence, the one upon the
other in the slightest degree. The true meaning is that the whole power of one of
these departments should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of either of the other departments."
179. Id. at 396.
180. Vanderbilt, C.J., records the incident in Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240,
250, 74 A2d 406, 411 (1950) : "Notwithstanding the rejection of the language of the
proposed 1944 Constitution which would have emasculated the rule-making power
of the Supreme Court, in 1948 the Legislature passed S-58, section two of which
provided in part that the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, effective September 15, 1948, 'shall regulate practice and procedure in the courts established by
the Constitution until modified, altered, or abrogated by law.' The bill was vetoed
by the Governor who returned it to the Legislature on October 30, 1948, stating that
in his opinion this provision was unconstitutional, 'for it would, if effective, completely
deprive the Supreme Court of any further rule-making authority . . .,' 71 N.J.L.J.
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that the legislature will resume control by slow encroachment. Piecemeal legislative tinkering within the framework of court rule might
be ultimately more disastrous even than immediate return to statutory
regulation. The continuing exercise of dual powers within the procedural realm would allow at best an unstable symmetry of system.
We have sought to assure ourselves the advantage of professional
wisdom and experience in the formulation of our rules of practice. If
an ill-advised and unconsidered legislative whim can at a stroke refute
the whole of this wisdom and experience, we have in fact gained very
little.18 ' But turn the adjectives around. Even were the court's initial
rule unsound and the legislative act the very soul of wisdom, still
a too-easy legislative intervention frustrates the whole end of judicial
rule-making.
We have seen that a cardinal virtue of the rule of
court is its ready flexibility and immediate responsiveness to current
problems, its ability to profit from the latest lessons of judicial empirical
science and to move quickly in self-revision. If the court has made a
mistake, it will be the first to know,"m and under the rule-making scheme
has ample opportunity for rapid change. If after this first alteration
the experience of the next ten, or of twenty, years should produce a
better system, it can again adapt. But once the legislature enters the
field, the area covered by this intervention is fixed with the force of
statute.:L
It cannot again be altered by the court, but must await the
389 (Nov. 4, 1948)." For discussion and suggestion that the threat of such wholesale legislative invasion may have influenced the Winberry decision, see Kaplan &
Greene, The Legislature'sRelation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REv. 234, 249 (1951). See also note 138 supra.
181. Pound quotes a speaker at a public hearing before the Judiciary Committee
of the Senate of New Jersey as reporting: "Under the old system, when the legislature had the primary power of rule making, every Monday, when the legislature
was in session, the hopper would be filled with bills by various assemblymen-young
lawyers-who happened to lose a case and in whose judgment it was brought about
because of deficiency in some rule of procedure. Immediately the hopper would
receive some bill intended to cure that." Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in
New Jersey, 66 HLv. L. REv. 28, 44 (1952). For the unfortunate Nebraska experience see note 36 supra. In Colorado the legislature has seen fit to revoke the power
of the court to make one particular, unpopular rule, that relating to comment on
the evidence. See note 7 supra.
Contrast the restraint of Congress after the adoption of the Federal Rules. "A
search has turned up in the rules area only a single statute, one of no far-reaching
import. Congress has seemed literally uninterested in all such proposals, and committee chairmen have quite regularly turned them over to the Court or the Advisory
Committee for final attention. The fear of recurrence of legislative tinkering has been
a profound stimulus for the presently contemplated reconstitution of the Advisory
Committee." Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLuh!. L. REv.
435, 443 (1958).
182. For the role which a Judicial Council should play in keeping the court
informed see Clark, supra note 181, at 443-44.
183. The alternative of holding that the court may promptly promulgate a further
rule which shall supersede the statute until the legislature act again (see the discussion of this possibility developing in Missouri, supra note 130) was wisely rejected
in Win-berry. See note 131 supra and text at that point. Compare the discussion in
Kaplan & Greene, supra note 180, at 248.

1958]

LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER JUDICIAL RULE-MAKING

39

superior pleasure of the legislature. However wise and immediately
successful the statute at the time of its enactment, it is inelastic. Over
the course of years this point of petrification in the viable body of procedure may be expected to grow as painful as a gallstone.
The life of constitutions is a long one. Statutes accumulate.
If the legislature is given unqualified power to overrule the courts
on matters of procedure there may well come a time, in the course of
that long life, when the jurisdiction will arrive at what is in effect a
return to the rigidities of code procedure. To affirm the power of selfregulation of the courts and to restrict the dangers of statutory whim
and statutory petrification, qualifications must be placed upon the
legislative supremacy. It is important that the legislature have power of
review. But it is equally important that that power be exercised only
upon due deliberation and that, once exercised, its products shall be
subject to periodic reappraisal.
Three basic safeguards should suffice to secure these ends. The
first is that an enactment which would effect the repeal or amendment of any existing rule of court or which would establish a new
procedural regulation, whether or not inconsistent with existing
rules, should be required to receive some portion more than a simple
majority vote in the legislature. In this we have the precedent of the
new Alaskan Constitution which provides that court-made rules may
be "changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected
to each house." 184 The effect of such provision is to discourage rash
and too-facile intervention in the business of the courts. Legislative attention is focused upon a bill proposing to regulate court procedure and
substantial legislative support is required for its passage. This is in
accord with the fundamental proposition that the place of the legislature in the field of judicial administration and procedure should be that
of a reserved ultimate reviewing power, not that of a frequently-intervening supervisory force. On the whole, the courts can be expected
to manage their own business as well as it can be managed. If in some
particular they do not, they should have a first chance to experiment
and change. Recurrent legislative overhaul of mere mechanics is not
in order. It is only in the case of a persistent and flagrantly unpopular
course of judicial conduct, a case in which the courts have made an
important decision of public policy and made it in a way that substantially opposes the strong sense of popular opinion, that appeal to
overruling legislative authority is needed. In such a case public disapproval of judiciary policy should express itself in a strong preponder184.

See note 36 -upra.
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ance of the legislative vote. Two-thirds of the legislators selected to
each house should concur upon the need for intervention before the
legislature moves to intervene.8

5

Second, before the legislature enters the area of court procedure it
should understand the views of the court. This could be assured
constitutionally by a provision that, in consideration of a bill proposing
an enactment to regulate judicial administration on procedure, the
chief justice of the supreme court shall be given an opportunity to
be heard. The voice of the chief justice will impress upon the legislators
the importance of the enactment under consideration.
It will be able
to appraise for the voting legislators the effect of the proposed alteration
upon the whole judicial scheme of business and to approve or disapprove with the influence of authority. This in itself may suffice to
put the matter to rest. If, however, the legislative scheme seems good,
the court, once brought to consider it, may choose itself to adopt the
proposal by rule of court and altogether obviate the need for legislative
action. If the words of the proposal embody some unclarity, the court,
with its more practiced eye and experienced understanding of the
concrete situations in which question may be expected to arise, can
request a clearer exposition of legislative intent and by so much reduce
the risk of multiplying litigation of procedure. And if there occurs
a real conflict between judicial and legislative opinion, compromise is
possible before enactment. The precise manner in which the chief justice shall communicate the views of his court must be left to the convenience of court and legislature. But that he shall in some manner
be heard on issues of concern to the court is of such primary importance
as to demand express constitutional provision.
Third, provision should be made for the automatic termination of
effect of all such enactments, so that the areas frozen down by legislative
intervention may again become, within a reasonable time, accessible to
alteration by the courts. To achieve this essential flexibility of renovation a Judicial Article should require that any statute governing court
procedure or administration shall have the force and effect of statute
only during a period of six years'8 6 immediately following the date of
185. This is not intended, nor should it operate, to deny the governor a right of
veto. The added influence of the chief executive, and the further reflection required
by reconsideration may prove significant. Cf. the role of the Governor in the New
Jersey experience, note 180 supra.
As is clear from the text, the legislature may act to change a rule of court or it
may intervene to add a provision dealing with a problem not specifically covered by any
court rule, or it may take the initiative and deal with a larger area concerning which
no provisions at all have been formulated by the court as, e.g., execution of judgments or evidence. The special conditions, including the two-thirds rule, should apply
equally in all of the situations mentioned.
186. Where a legislature meets only once every two years, a shorter period
would not appear appropriate and a longer period involves risks of rigidity.
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its taking effect and shall, at the expiration of those six years, cease
to have the effect of statute, but shall continue in effect as a rule of court
subject to repeal or amendment by the court or by two-thirds vote of
the members elected to each house. During the six years of statutory
effect, the enactment may of course be repealed, altered or reenacted by
the legislature in the same manner, and any amendment or reenactment
will then be immune from court alteration for a period of six years
from the time it takes effect.1' 7 In establishing such a pattern of limitation, a merry-go-round of regimes is not to be feared. Over a period of
six years, the courts will have thoroughly tested out any legislative plan
of procedure, established its merits, learned to live with its deficiencies.
If at the end of that time, the court feels that there is still a strong preponderance of legislative support for the plan, the court will no doubt
consider seriously whether to defer to the legislative will rather than
run the risk of overturning the procedural scheme only to have it turned
back up again by legislative override. Deference is not unlikely. Thus
the legislature remains influential even in inaction. The very existence
of potential legislative veto forces the courts themselves to regard
problems of procedure from the legislative as well as from the judicial
viewpoint. But if the legislative plan has seriously hampered the
courts, the court will change it, and the chief justice will be prepared to
argue convincingly to the legislature the necessity of such change. In
the light of experience, the legislature may now be ready to surrender
its own scheme and to accept that proposed by the court, or at least to
consider compromise. Or if the plan is one which a strong majority of
the legislators deem too clearly dictated by public policy to compromise,
the legislature may reenact it every few years and thus entirely forestall return to court rule. But such reenactment will not go without
reappraisal. Positive action by two-thirds of the legislators elected to
each house is again required, and the chief justice must be heard. The
legislature must reappraise its own enactments upon pain of having the
court reappraise them. Any area of procedure "frozen down" under
this scheme will in the long run be frozen not by inertia, but by virtue
of a strong continuing support among the elected representatives of the
people. This is as it should be. Procedure, neither unstable nor overrigid, remains responsive to the urges of both court and legislature.
187. Where an amendment serves only to make minor changes in a procedural
statute it should not necessarily be held to extend the effective period of the original
statute beyond the first six year period. It will be for the court to determine, in the
light of the context of legislative history as well as the form by wbich the change
was ellected, whether the second act constitutes a reaffirmation of the basic legislative
policy of the first.
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CONCLUSION

The whole aim of the balance of powers suggested in this paper is
the creation of a scheme whereby the courts may maintain an effective,
flexible and thorough-going control over their own administration and
procedure, with the possibility of ultimate legislative review in cases
where important decisions of public policy are necessarily involved.
This is the aim of safe efficiency: immediately practical, fundamentally
democratic. It is intended to encompass all matters traditionally considered "adjective law", all pleading, pretrial, trial and post-trial mechanisms, all evidence, including presumptions and privilege, and the
whole of the internal organization of the modern court system. Such
a balance of powers might be established, we believe, by a constitutional
provision essentially as follows:
1. The supreme court shall make rules governing the administration, practice and procedure,including evidence, of all courts in the
state.
2. Such rules, or any statute enacted under this paragraph,may be
repealed, amended or supplemented by the legislatureby two-thirds
vote of the members elected to each house, and any such enactment
shall have the force and effect of statute during the six years next
following the date of its taking effect and shall thereafter have
effect as rule of court until repealed or amended by the supreme
court or by the legislature.
3. In consideration of any bill proposing an enactment under this
section, the chief justice of the state shall be given opportunity to
be heard.

